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The Effect of ESG Information on Market Returns in Mergers 
Runyun Song 
Using environment, social and governance (ESG) data from the MSCI Intangible Value 
Assessment (IVA) database, we examine how the aggregate ESG information and the ESG 
pillar information of targets and acquirers influence their market returns and total market 
returns around the announcement date. We find that acquirers with higher ESG-related risks 
and incommensurate managerial ability have lower acquirer and synergistic market returns. 
We find that an acquirer’s aggregate ESG strength has a significant positive impact on its 
market returns, yet the impact of a target’s aggregate ESG performance is not very certain or 
significant. The target’s governance strength and the acquirer’s social strength are valued by 
the market. We also find that targets in the IVA database tend to be large firms with good 
performance. This phenomenon may explain the insignificant influences of the target’s ESG 
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With the increasing emphasis on the sustainability or social responsibility of a firm, many 
scholars have studied the impact of a firm’s environmental, social or governmental (ESG) 
strength on its performance and its cost of capital, for example, Goss and Roberts (2011), Choi 
(2011), Landier and Nair (2009), Guenster et al., among others. However, we believe that 
ESG factors also influence the market returns of acquirers and targets during a merger. Given 
that the acquirer needs to manage environmental pollution exposures in many countries, 
weakness in ESG issues indicates higher potential risk exposure in the future. What is more, as 
found by a large portion of researchers, ESG strength is positively related to better firm 
performance and a lower cost of capital. Large asset owners also pay more and more attention 
to ESG issues to achieve a sustainable growth. However, most studies establish correlation 
instead of causality between sustainability and corporate financial performance (Fulton, Kahn, 
Sharples 2012), as using within-firm time-series variation may result in endogeneity (Wong 
and Xie, 2008). The target’s ownership is fundamentally changed during a merger, as both the 
target’s and the acquirer’s stock prices change significantly around the announcement. The 
acquirer’s policies, management team and technology will be applied to the target, while the 
acquirer may also have the chance to learn from the targets in ESG fields. Thus, we believe it is 
necessary to analyse the impact the target or acquirer ESG factors have on their market returns, 
or whether investors value these factors. The effect of a difference in the acquirer and target 
ESG levels on synergistic gains (losses) can also be investigated throughout this process. 
We use data from a new database, which has not frequently been used in existing studies. The 
MSCI ESG Research Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) database provides data related to 
firms’ ESG issues. On the one hand, it can be regarded as a measure of firms’ ESG 
performance. On the other hand, IVA ESG data can be divided into firms’ risk exposure related 
to ESG issues and their corresponding risk managerial ability. These features make IVA ESG 
data ideal for our research.  
To begin, we investigate the impact of target ESG strength on M&A performance. We find that 
the target’s aggregate ESG strength has a positive impact on synergistic merger returns around 
2 
 
the announcement date, but no significant influence on its own abnormal returns. In light of 
each E, S or G pillar strength, the target governance pillar has the most significant and positive 
effect on the target and total merger returns, especially in a longer event window. The effect of 
the environmental pillar is positive, yet it is only significant in a 3-day-event window around 
the announcement date. The social pillar shows no significant influence at all. Meanwhile, the 
acquirer’s high aggregate ESG level has a positive and significant effect on both the acquirer 
and total market returns around the announcement date. Among the acquirer’s three pillars, 
only the impact of the social pillar is significant. A higher social pillar level increases the 
acquirer’s market returns and total synergistic merger returns. These impacts are significant in 
event windows as long as 41 days around the announcement date. We find no significant 
impact of the difference between acquirers’ and targets’ ESG levels. 
From the perspective of the ESG risk and corresponding risk managerial ability, we find that if 
the acquirer’s ESG managerial ability is not commensurate with its high ESG risk, both its 
merger returns and the total merger returns will decrease. 
In our additional analysis section, we find that the firms included in the IVA database are larger 
in size and perform better. Then, we examine the reason from the sample selection criteria of 
the IVA database and provide a possible explanation for why the main results we obtain are 
less significant than our expectations. The criteria of the IVA database also indicate that our 
main findings may not be as applicable to smaller and worse-performing firms as to larger, 
high-performing firms. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, we use a new database, MSCI IVA 
ESG, which has not frequently been used to conduct research in this field. Second, we examine 
the impact of the difference between the acquirer’s and the target’s ESG levels on the total 
market returns in mergers. Third, we study a firm’s ESG issue from the aspect of potential ESG 
risk and corresponding managerial ability. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 traces and reviews the existing literature 
in sustainable investing (SI), corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the impact of ESG 
issues. Section 3 introduces the hypothesis of this paper. The data and methodology are 
described in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 present the main results and some additional analysis, 
respectively. Section 7 is the conclusion of the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
SI and its corporate counterpart CSR have been widely discussed since the 1960’s. As an 
ethically oriented investment strategy when it was founded, SI (or originally socially 
responsible investing) gradually shifted to a broader approach including environmental, social, 
corporate and financial factors in the late 1990s. Like its counterpart, early-CSR referred to 
corporate philanthropy and social relations in the 1950s. The concept was regarded as a 
trade-off between corporate financial and social performance, which violates the maximum 
shareholder value business objective posed by Friedman. However, some scholars view CSR 
strategy from other perspectives. Johnson (1971) proposed its importance in maximising a 
firm’s long-term profit. More recently, Jensen (2001) holds that only by creating a win-win 
situation with customers and community, firms can maximise their long-term performance.  
Throughout this period, to satisfy scholars’ and investors’ desire for more concrete definitions, 
some related terms have been created by different market participants. Mercer (2007) defines 
modern socially responsible investing as ‘an investment process that seeks to achieve social 
and environmental objectives alongside financial objectives, utilizing both values-driven, and 
risk and return screening’ (page 64), and CSR as ‘an approach to business which takes into 
account economic, social, environmental and ethical impacts for a variety of reasons, including 
mitigating risk, decreasing costs, and improving brand image and competitiveness’ (page 60). 
Since 2003, the UNEP FI Asset Management Working Group (AMWG) was founded to study 
the influence of ESG factors on the investment process and valuation. Although there is no 
definitive list, ESG factors are used globally to describe one or more of the following 
characteristics:  
i. Issues that have traditionally been considered non-financial or not material  
ii. A medium- or long-term time horizon 
iii. Qualitative objects that are not readily quantifiable in monetary terms 
iv. Externalities (costs borne by other firms or by society at large) not well captured by 
market mechanisms 
v. A changing regulatory or policy framework 




vii. A public-concern focusi
After 2003, the ESG factors were defined in the contemporary CSR framework. Fulton, Kahn 
and Sharples (2012) conclude that contemporary CSR is an assembly of ESG factors, corporate 
citizenship and economic responsibility. They also use SI to define all forms of socially 
responsible investing and ESG-oriented investing. 
 
Both scholars and brokers have studied the materiality of the influence of ESG and CSR. Such 
researchers mainly focus on two fields: the correlation to the corporate cost of capital and the 
correlation to the corporate financial performance. In light of CSR and the cost of capital, most 
of the researchers find a positive relationship between corporate high CSR performance and a 
lower cost of equity capital or debt capital. Ghoul et al. (2011) find firms with a higher CSR 
score enjoy cheaper equity financing in the U.S. Goss and Roberts (2011) hold that companies 
with below average ESG records pay a 7–18 basis point premium, yet lenders are not sensitive 
to such information if the borrower is a high-quality one. Among the three ESG pillars (E, S or 
G) and cost of capital, corporate governance is the one studied most extensively. Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) find the correlation between better corporate governance and a lower bond 
yield, and they explained that governance reduces the agency costs and information asymmetry 
between the firm and lenders, thus contributing to a lower default risk. Choi (2011) proves that 
firms with poorer corporate governance suffer from higher costs of equity capital with Korean 
samples. As for environmental performance, Schneider (2011) interprets poor environmental 
performance as a determinant of bankruptcy risk by increasing future environmental liabilities, 
compliance and clean-up cost. However, Schneider (2011) concludes that firms’ 
environmental performance is a significant component of bond pricing, yet for high-quality 
bonds, the effect of environmental concerns is much smaller. Chava (2011) finds that firms 
with environmental strengths embrace higher expected returns and lower interest rates on loans. 
Few works are done regarding social factors: Bauer et al. (2009) examine the relationship 
between employee relations and credit risk; they find that firms with better employee relations 
have less debt, higher credit ratings and lower firm-specific risk. No study on the aggregate 
ESG issue is conducted in this field because each factor may have a different strength to the 
cost of capital due to their broad nature (Fulton, Kahn, Sharples 2012). 
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In terms of the relationship between CSR/SI and corporate financial performance, corporate 
financial performance is divided into two areas: market-based performance measured by stock 
price, bond price, Tobin’s Q, etc., and accounting-based performance measured by firm value, 
return on assets, etc. To sum up, most studies recognise that firms with strong CSR have better 
corporate financial performance. Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that 
high-sustainability firms have better stock and accounting performance in the long run. Luo 
and Bhattacharya (2006) offer evidence that CSR strength results in a higher market value by 
increasing customer satisfaction. When it comes to the impact of ESG on corporate financial 
performance, scholars worked on both the aggregate and disaggregated ESG, yet literature on 
disaggregated ESG performance still outnumbers aggregated performance. The reason stated 
by Fulton, Kahn and Sharples (2012) is similar to the one given above. The main results found 
in those papers vary; however, we can still conclude that in most of the papers, ESG factors are 
positively related to corporate financial performance. Many researchers have studied the effect 
of corporate governance. Gompers et al. (2001) construct a governance index and realise that 
‘firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher firm value, higher profits, lower capital 
expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.ii’ Ammann et al. (2010) construct other 
three indices of their own and prove that strong corporate governance is positively related to 
firm value and accounting-based performance. Meanwhile, Bhagat and Boton (2008) find no 
correlation between governance and a company’s future market performance. Bauer et al. 
(2003) find a negative relationship between corporate governance and firms’ value. 
In terms of environmental concerns, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2003) reach the conclusion that 
environmental strength is positively linked with better economic performance. Guenster et al. 
(2011) contribute to this field by extending environmental factors to eco-efficiency and find a 
positive association between a firm’s operating performance and its market value. However, 
Fernando et al. (2010) find that the stock market is indifferent to either the positive or the 
negative environmental performance. Fu and Shan (2009) focus on corporate social equality 
and conclude that there is a positive relation between equality and stock returns and the market 
valuation of the company. Derwall et al. (2011) argue that the abnormal returns created by a 
strong-employee-relations portfolio disappear in the long term. Only one study is conducted 
using aggregate ESG: Landier and Nair (2009) also conduct a responsible portfolio within S&P 
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500 and find it embraces a slightly higher average return. 
Given the key findings in the existing literature, it seems that CSR/SI does not mean a trade-off 
between sustainability and economic benefits; they can be adopted as a strategic tool to 
enhance shareholders’ value and firms’ value. In addition to the internal motivation, the 
external “push” from civil society, government, NGOs and investors is emerging. Taking the 
environmental pillar as an example, the EU has approved the Environmental Liability 
Directive and made firms financially liable for solving their environmental externalities. In the 
U.S., the administration of President Barack Obama has pledged to increase the enforcement of 
existing environmental regulations and adopt stricter standards. Thirty additional contaminants 
under the federal Safe Water Drinking Act are taken into account by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency. Tougher and increasing future regulations mean future risks or even 
liabilities for companies. From the perspective of investors, institutional and other large asset 
owners, they possess a slice of the entire economy, and thus seek long-term, enduring 
economic growth. Other investors, who adopt a best-in-class approach and pursue continual 
outperformance of firms, think about ESG factors as well.  
The impact of ESG factors may exist in the process of mergers. As mentioned in section 1, the 
target’s pollution exposures will be traced back for decades and succeeded by bidders in many 
countries. Deng, Kang and Low (2013) view the necessities from the aspect of stakeholder 
wealth. From their point of view, investing in CSR suggests that firms may have a stronger 
reputation for keeping their commitment; therefore, stakeholders are more willing to contribute 
to the firms’ long-term probability and efficiency. As a result, the value of shareholders is 
increased. In other words, higher CSR acquirers will enjoy higher merger announcement 
returns. As for corporate governance, a change in control may lead to the change in shareholder 
rights and other governance policies (Wong and Xie, 2008). They show that the difference in 
corporate governance between bidders and targets improves the synergistic gains from 
mergers.  
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we set three hypotheses based on Sections 1 and 2. From the perspective of ESG 
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performance, we expect that better target ESG (E, S or G) performance positively influences 
the target and total market performance around the announcement date (Hypothesis 1). 
Regardless of the level of the acquirer’s ESG, the target’s ESG strength should be valued by 
investors. That is to say, we suppose that a higher target ESG score and each pillar score are 
related to higher target abnormal returns and total abnormal returns around the announcement 
date. Regarding the acquirer’s ESG factor, the result may be uncertain because it may be 
related to the target’s ESG performance. If there ends up being a positive relationship between 
the acquirer’s ESG strengths and abnormal returns (or total abnormal returns) around the 
announcement date, then it means that acquirers with better ESG performance may have better 
regulations, technology, management team or experience, which make them outstanding. 
These benefits can help those acquirers successfully deal with the ESG issues of targets. 
Similarly, if the acquirer’s ESG performance is better than the target’s, the acquirer can 
improve the target’s ESG performance and thus increase its future market and financial 
performance. As a result, we suppose that if the acquirer’s ESG (E, S or G) performance is 
better than the target’s, there will be a positive impact on their total market value around the 
announcement date (Hypothesis 2). If the acquirer’s ESG performance is worse than the 
target’s, the condition could be complicated. The weakness in the ESG technology or 
managerial ability of an acquirer with poor ESG performance may ruin the target’s strength in 
ESG fields, which may lead to a negative impact on the acquirer’s abnormal return and total 
abnormal returns around the announcement date. However, if acquirers can learn from targets 
and improve themselves, the impact may not be negative.  
From the perspective of ESG risk and managerial ability, we suppose that acquirers with high 
potential ESG risk and incommensurate managerial capability has lower acquirer (and total) 
market abnormal returns around the announcement date (Hypothesis 3), as we believe that they 
cannot manage additional risk acquired from targets. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data source and sample descriptions 
Our merger and acquisition samples are extracted from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) 
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US Mergers and Acquisition database. Mergers between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 
2015 are selected using the following criteria: 
i. Both acquirers and targets are public US firms; 
ii. Neither acquirers nor targets are financial institutions; 
iii. Neither acquirers nor targets belong to the utility industry (water, electricity or gas); 
iv. The acquisition is not cross-border; 
v. The form of the deal is a merger or acquisition of majority interest; 
vi. The period between two consecutive bids of the same target is at least 250 days; 
vii. The period between two consecutive bids on the same target by the same acquirer is at 
least 6 months; 
As a result, we get 2748 mergers. The reason we exclude utilities is that the actions of these 
firms could be highly related to each other. Considering that different countries may have 
various regulations and standard in ESG fields, we exclude cross-border mergers because we 
think the country level disparities may either enhance or eliminate the firm-level ESG 
differences. If the form of the deal is acquisition, the acquirer and target still operate 
independently afterwards. The acquirer’s benefit in ESG issues may not be applied to the target, 
so we exclude those deals whose form of deal is acquisition. 
Then, we use the data from the MSCI ESG Research IVA as the measurement of ESG factors. 
The IVA analyzes risk and opportunities arose from ESG issues for companies. Key ESG 
issues in each industry are identified, and firms are evaluated according to their exposure to 
these issues and their risk managerial ability. Then, after weighing the exposure and 
managerial ability, the IVA assigns scores to each firm on ESG pillars. The aggregate ESG 
industry adjusted score is set against the industry peers. First recorded in 1999, the scores range 
from 0 to 10. Finally, a rating from AAA (the best) to CCC (the worst) is assigned to each firm 
based on the aggregate ESG industry adjusted score, but the methodology of the assignment is 
not mentioned. Considering that the rates are developed from the score and not assigned to 
each pillar, we use the score as our main dependent variables in the paper.  
According to the methodology document, IVA ESG scores can be interpreted in two ways. On 
one hand, a higher score reflects a firm’s better overall performance on ESG issues. On the 
other hand, scores can be regarded as a measure of their future risk exposure and corresponding 
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managerial ability to manage that risk. If the firm has anticipated the future risk and has the 
managerial ability to deal with the risk, the risk may turn into opportunities for the firm. As a 
result, firms with no or little future risk on ESG factors are not assigned a high score under this 
mechanism. In fact, scores equaling 5 are interpreted as follows: “Risk management is 
commensurate with the current level of risk exposure, but not anticipating future risks, some 
probability of adverse impact to the company.”iii While a higher score indicates a higher level 
of risk exposure and sufficient management capability to deal with it, a lower score suggests a 
gap between the high-risk exposure and managerial ability. A score equaling 7 indicates that 
the firm is anticipating future risks. A score equaling 3 suggests that the firm’s risk 
management on ESG issues is not commensurate with its level of risk, and the risks could 
negatively affect the firm. Therefore, we define scores around 5 (from 3 to 7, excluding 3 and 7) 
as little risk, scores of 3 or lower as high risks with incommensurate managerial ability, and 
scores greater than or equal to 7 as high risk with commensurate managerial ability.  
Financial data of the targets are collected from Compustat North America Fundamental Annual 
database, and the abnormal returns of acquirers and targets are extracted from Eventus 
database. Both acquirers’ and targets’ cumulated abnormal returns are based on a market 
model and value weighted. Our sample group A consists of those mergers whose target IVA 
data are available before the announcement, and sample group B is made of those mergers 
whose target and acquirer are listed in the IVA database prior to the announcement date. By 
adding the financial data of targets to sample group A, we construct sample group C. Due to the 
blanks, the sample size of observations used to run the regression were reduced to 128 and 115 
for sample groups A and B, while sample group C involves 54 mergers correspondingly. Table 
1 shows the summary statistics of the cumulated abnormal returns of sample group A. Table 2 
presents the summary statistics of targets’ and acquirers’ ESG scores of sample A and B. Table 
3 shows the summary statistics of merger characteristics and targets’ financial data in Panels A 
and B, respectively. 
The year distribution of targets in sample group A is presented in Table 4 Panel A. According 
to Chang, Kuo and Chen (2013), sustainability performance varies among industries, so we use 
the two-digit SIC code of each company to define its industry. The industry distribution of 
targets in sample group A is displayed in Table 4 Panel B.  
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4.2 Variable construction 
We measure firms’ aggregate ESG performance by the industry adjusted score. The 
performance of each E, S or G factor is measured by the E, S or G pillar score. To examine the 
impact of the acquirer and target difference on ESG, we construct dummy variables for 
mergers where acquirers have higher (lower) ESG scores (or E, S, G pillar score) than targets. 
They are labeled as A>T ESG (E, S or G) score or A<T ESG (E, S or G) score. To measure 
firms’ ESG risk exposure and managerial ability, we also construct 2 dummy variables, Target 
(Acquirer) ESG score0–3 and Target (Acquirer) ESG score7–10. Both indicate high potential 
risk exposure, but score 0–3 suggest an incommensurate risk management capability. Score 
710, in contrast, indicates a commensurate risk management power. 
The gains (losses) of targets’ (acquirers’) market returns are measured by the value-weighted 
cumulated market model abnormal returns around the announcement date. The estimation 
period ends 46 days prior to the announcement, and the length of the estimation period is 250 
days. Considering that the premium, target size and acquirer size extracted from SDC Platinum 
are four weeks prior to the announcement date, our longest event window starts 20 trading days 
prior to announcement date and ends 20 trading days after that date. Four windows are used for 
the CARs: (-20,-2), (-1, 1), (2, 20) and (-20, 20). The reason we include an event window as 
long as 41 days around the announcement date is that the impact of ESG factors may not be 
fully recognised in a short period, and the market may need a longer time to act on the changes. 
We also construct the portfolio cumulated abnormal return of targets and acquirers weighted by 
their market capital four weeks prior to the announcement date so that we can analyse the total 
market returns of the merger. 
In terms of control variables, we include features of the deal, targets and acquirers. Among 
features of the deal, we expect that tender offers tend to increase the gains of both targets and 
acquirers, and targets will capture a larger proportion of gains (Brandley, Desai and Kim, 1988). 
Payment by all cash is also linked to a higher abnormal return (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
2002; Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas, 2008). As for the features of the targets and acquirers, 
Moellera, Schlingemannb and Stulzc (2004) find that small firms have higher abnormal returns 
than larger ones, while targets with higher Tobin’s q are supposed to have higher target and 
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total returns (Servaes 1991). Since no observation in our sample is a leveraged buyout (LBO), 
we do not include a dummy variable measuring LBO in control variables. Definitions of all the 
variables are listed in Appendices. 
4.3 Methodology 
We perform OLS regressions to test the impact of firms’ ESG factors level on their abnormal 
returns around the announcement date to assess how they influence firms’ market value. When 
we focus on targets’ ESG factors, the explanatory variables are the ESG score, E score, S score 
and G score of targets independently. Explained variables are the target’s CAR（TCAR）and 
market capital weighted portfolio CAR of the target and acquirer (PCAR) in each event 
window. Control variables consist of features of the target in variable definitions Panel B 
(exclude institutional) and characteristics of the deal in Panel C. Similarly, when studying the 
influence of acquirers’ ESG level, the ESG score, E score, S score and G score of targets are 
used as independent variable in each model. The acquirers’ CAR (ACAR) and PCAR in each 
event window are the dependent variables in the models. Control variables are those measuring 
the acquirer’s characteristics in variable definitions Panel B and characteristics of the deal in 
Panel C. Specially, dummy variables comparing acquirers’ and targets’ ESG score, A>T ESG 
(E, S or G) score or A<T ESG (E,S or G) score are adapted as independent variables at the same 
time in one model. To further analyze the combined impact of acquirers’ and targets’ ESG 
factors, we divide the performance into managerial ability and potential risks. Unfortunately, 
IVA ESG data provide no measurement on firms’ absolute ESG risk managerial ability. The 
management capability is only compared with its corresponding ESG risk exposure. Therefore, 
we only generally regress the dummy variables Target (Acquirer) ESG score0–3 and Target 
(Acquirer) ESG score7–10 on TCAR (ACAR) and PCAR with control variables to see what we 
can find from the statistical results. Target (Acquirer) ESG score0–3 and Target (Acquirer) 
ESG score7–10 are also used as explanatory variables at the same time. 
5. Main results 
Because IVA ESG scores can be interpreted in two ways, ESG performance, and risk exposure 
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and managerial ability on ESG issues, we conduct our research with both interpretations in this 
section. We will examine the effect of ESG factors on abnormal returns from two general 
perspectives: targets’ (acquirers’) ESG strength, acquirers’ and targets’ ESG factors 
differences.  
5.1  ESG level of acquirers and targets 
We start with the interpretation of ESG performance. First, we purely examine the relationship 
between targets’ (acquirers’) ESG levels and CARs. The other interpretation will be studied in 
next subsection 5.2.  
5.1.1 Targets’ ESG performance 
First, we investigate the relationship between target’s aggregate ESG factors and abnormal 
returns. As mentioned in the previous section, both targets’ abnormal returns and portfolio 
abnormal returns are studied as dependent variables. The regressions of aggregate target ESG 
factors on targets’ abnormal returns are shown in Table 5, and the results of target’s aggregate 
ESG factors and portfolio abnormal returns are shown in Table 6. From Table 5, we can 
observe that targets’ aggregate ESG scores are not significantly related to target’s CAR around 
announcement date. However, they have a positive relationship with portfolio CAR in (-1, 1), 
and the result is significant for the larger sample group A.  
Tables 7 and 8 present the regressions of each E, S and G factor as independent variables on 
TCAR and PCAR, respectively. Statistics displayed indicate that targets’ social pillar score is 
not significantly related to their CAR aroused by a merger announcement. As for targets’ 
governance pillar score, it is positively linked to their CAR in (-20, 20) and (-20, -2). The 
environmental pillar score has a positive relationship with targets’ CAR in both (-1, 1) and (-20, 
20) windows, but it is only significant in the short window (-1, 1) with the smaller sample 
group C. When we use the portfolio CAR as the dependent variable, neither the environmental 
pillar nor social pillar score has a significant relationship with the portfolio CAR in any 
window studied. Only the governance pillar score is positively related to the portfolio CAR in 
all windows displayed, and the result is significant in the (-20, -2) window. Given the p-value 
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of the independent variable in Table 8 Panel A column 8, the positive relationship between the 
governance pillar score and portfolio CAR is not far from the 10% significance level.  
To sum up, the evidence does not fully support our Hypothesis 1 that a higher ESG level of the 
target is valued by the market; the condition seems to be more complicated. The target’s 
aggregate ESG strength has a positive impact on the synergetic gains of a merger around the 
announcement date, yet it does not affect the target’s market behavior. After analysing each 
ESG factor, we find a possible explanation. The governance strength of target firms, as many 
scholars studied, has the most significant positive impact on both target and total market 
returns. In contrast, targets’ social factor level seems to be completely neglected by the market, 
while the positive impact of environmental pillar on target stock return is only significant in 3 
days around announcement date. Therefore, the aggregate effect of three factors can be offset 
by the different impact of each factor, which leads to the insignificant result of the aggregate 
ESG score. Other possible reasons will be analysed in Section 6. 
5.1.2 Acquirers’ ESG performance 
After focusing on the target’s ESG level in the previous subsection, we test the impact of the 
acquirer’s ESG factors on the acquirer’s CAR and portfolio CAR. Due to the limit of sample 
size and availability of Compustat data, we conduct the regressions with the larger sample 
group C. That means control variables measuring firm performance, Tobin’s q, ROA and 
Leverage, are not included in the models here. Table 9 shows the regressions analysing the 
impact of acquirers’ aggregate ESG performance. Regressions related to each E, S or G factor 
and ACAR are presented in Table 10, and regressions related to each E, S or G factor and 
PCAR are listed in Table 11. Acquirers’ aggregate ESG score is positively associated with both 
acquirers’ CAR and portfolio CAR. The relationship is significant at the 10% significance 
level in (-20, 20) with acquirers’ CAR and nearly significant with portfolio CAR in (-20, 20). 
Environmental and governance pillar scores are not significantly related to either acquirers’ 
CAR or portfolio CAR, while the social pillar score has a positive and significant relationship 
with acquirers’ CAR in (2, 20), (-20, 20), and with portfolio CAR in (2, 20).  
Based on these results, we can conclude that the acquirer’s total ESG strength has a positive 
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and significant impact on its abnormal returns around the announcement date, yet the impact on 
total market returns is not statistically significant. This supports one of our expectations in 
section 3 that the market may think an acquirer with good ESG performance can deal with the 
target’s ESG-related affairs properly. Among E, S and G pillars, only an acquirer’s social pillar 
strength has significant and positive impacts on acquirer and total market returns, while the 
other two pillars have no significant influence on the market. 
Comparing the conclusions from subsection 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, we find that investors pay 
attention to different pillars of acquirers and targets. As for targets, governance pillar strength 
is valued most significantly. Regarding acquirers, social pillar strength is the only pillar with 
significant influence. The reasons for this phenomenon can be explored in further research. 
5.2 Acquirers’ and targets’ ESG performance differences 
In this subsection, we take both targets’ and acquirers’ ESG conditions into account and 
investigate their joint effect on total gains or losses of the merger. Unfortunately, compared 
with mergers in which the acquirer and target enjoy the same ESG level (or E, S G level), 
mergers that are combinations of firms of different ESG levels (or E, S G levels) have no 
significant higher or lower total CARs. Regression results are not displayed in the paper, but 
they are available if requested. The conclusions are not consistent with Hypothesis 2. We 
believe that when studying the acquirers’ and targets’ differences on ESG issues, it may not be 
accurate enough to regard ESG scores as performance. Therefore, we try to view ESG scores 
from a different aspect. According to the methodology provided by the MSCI IVA database, as 
we have mentioned, the score can be interpreted as the combination of ESG risk exposures and 
corresponding management capability. Therefore, in the next subsection, we will re-do part of 
our research with new dummy variables measuring the risk and management of targets and 
acquirers. 
 
5.3 Risk exposure and management capability on ESG issues 
As mentioned in previous section 4, according to the methodology of MSCI IVA ESG database, 
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scores around 5 indicate that firms with little future potential risks. Thus, we re-do some of our 
research in section 5.1 with the dummy variables Target (Acquirer) score0–3 and Target 
(Acquirer) score7–10. The new results related to targets’ ESG level are presented in Tables 12 
and 13. Compared with targets with little risk, targets with higher future risk and sufficient risk 
managerial ability are significantly associated with a lower target CAR, while targets with 
higher future risks and incommensurate risk managerial ability are significantly related to a 
higher portfolio CAR. These results are bizarre, but can be explained by the fact that targets’ 
management team and regulations may be changed after the merger. That is to say, their risk 
managerial ability can be less critical than their future risk exposure, and how the market 
responds to their potential risks depends on the acquirer. However, the risk managerial ability 
in ESG scores is only evaluated for a firm’s current level of risk correspondingly. There is no 
absolute standard for it, so we cannot construct a variable or interaction to measure the 
collective impact of a target’s risk and an acquirer’s risk managerial ability. All we can do is to 
simply analyse the mutual influence of the acquirer’s risk and managerial ability. We regress 
the dummy variables Acquirer score0–3 and Acquirer score7–10 on ACAR and PCAR; the 
regressions are listed in Table 14. We find that acquirers with high risk and no commensurate 
risk management suffer from a significantly low acquirer and portfolio CAR. The results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. It can be explained in such way that an acquirer who cannot 
manage its own ESG risks can hardly manage additional risks, if any, from the target after the 
merger. It seems that the concern of its incommensurate managerial ability on high ESG risk 
outweigh the expectation that it could learn from the target in the market. 
Overall, the evidence reported in this section does not fully support Hypothesis 1 that a target’s 
aggregate ESG strength has a positive influence on its own and portfolio market returns. 
Meanwhile, the effect of an acquirer’s aggregate ESG strength on the acquirer’s and total 
market returns turn out to be all positive and more significant. The impact of the target’s 
aggregate ESG strength, if significant, tends to gather in a much shorter period around the 
announcement date, while the acquirer’s influence seems to last longer. Regarding separate E, 
S or G factors, the results are not always consistent with our hypothesis, and the impacts are 
different for acquirers and targets, which is quite confusing. Targets’ governance pillar 
strength increases both targets’ and acquirers’ abnormal returns, which indicate that the value 
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of targets’ governance is fully recognised by the market. Targets’ environmental strength has a 
much weaker positive impact on targets’ and total gains, while the social factor level shows no 
significant result on the targets’ market returns and total market returns. As for acquirers, only 
their social factor strength increases acquirers’ and total CAR significantly. A higher 
environmental factor level has a positive and insignificant influence, while the influence of the 
governance pillar is surprisingly uncertain.  
Besides, mergers where acquirers and targets in different ESG (or each E, S or G) levels have 
no significant total gains or losses in market value around the announcement date, which is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. 
What is more, acquirers with higher risk and lack commensurate risk management suffer losses 
in the market around the announcement date. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Owing to 
the lack of absolute measurement of an acquirer’s risk management capability, the impact of 
the target’s and the acquirer’s risks and management ability differences remains uncertain. 
6. Additional analysis 
In this section, we attempt to determine why we obtained less significant results than expected, 
especially for targets, from the methodology of the MSCI IVA database. First, we will check 
whether firms included in the IVA database have any other particular characteristics. If they do, 
we will analyse how these features affect our regression results in section 5. 
6.1 Characteristics of firms in the MSCI IVA database 
To investigate whether firms in the IVA database are significantly different from those who are 
not, we merge our data from SDC with Compustat data by the targets’ financial data and obtain 
a sample of 608 mergers. These mergers are divided into two groups: with target IVA data and 
without target IVA data. With target IVA data group contains 124 observations, while the 
without target IVA data group has 484 observations. 
We check the announcement year and target industry distributions of these two groups. Table 
15 and Table 16 display the distributions correspondingly. Firms in the IVA database clearly 
are clustered in recent years, and mergers announced from 2013 to 2015 account for 54.84% of 
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the total. In contrast, firms out of the IVA database gather in much earlier years, 30.16% of 
mergers are announced in 1999 and 2000. As for the industry distributions, the distributions of 
two groups are quite similar. Consequently, we can conclude that the IVA database includes 
more new firms than old ones. As a new database started in 1999, this phenomenon is quite 
reasonable.  
Then, we conduct the following process to get the non-IVA control targets for targets in the 
IVA database. Targets with IVA data are matched with control targets without IVA data from 
the without target IVA data group by the same year announced, the same two-digit SIC code 
industry and the smallest absolute value of difference between their market value four weeks 
prior to the announcement. A total of 116 of the 124 targets with IVA targets have their 
non-IVA control targets. 
After that, we conduct the t-tests to analyse whether they are significantly different in size, 
leverage ratio, ROA and Tobin’s Q. The results of t-tests are displayed in Table 17. We find 
that targets with IVA data possess significantly larger size, a higher leverage ratio, ROA and 
Tobin’s Q than their non-IVA control firms. In other words, firms with IVA data are larger and 
have better performance. 
To investigate the reason for these features, we examine the sample selection criteria in the 
MSCI ESG Research IVA Methodology and MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes (IMI) 
Methodology, as samples in the IVA are taken from the IMI database. We find the reason for 
these features from the IMI methodology. Companies must meet some basic requirements to be 
covered by IMI. These requirements include:  
1) Equity universe minimum size requirements 
2) Equity universe minimum float-adjusted market capitalization requirement 
3) Minimum liquidity requirement 
4) Minimum foreign inclusion factor and foreign room requirement 
5) Minimum length of trading requirement 
As a result, it is clear that there are some preferences in the selection of samples in IVA data. 
These preferences may make our samples contain more large and good firms than average. 
How can these preferences affect our results? According to Goss and Roberts (2011) and 
Schneider (2011), lenders pay less attention to ESG issues of the firm if the borrower is a 
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high-quality one. Similarly, for good companies, people may easily be attracted by their 
performance, which is more clear and visual, and tend to neglect their ESG performance. The 
impact of larger firm size will be further studied in the next subsection. 
6.2 Impact of larger firms on the main results 
To assess whether larger targets’ ESG factors work differently from smaller targets, we divide 
sample group C into two further groups by the median of the target size. A target whose size is 
above the median is defined as ‘Large’; others are defined as ‘Small’.  
Then, we re-run the regressions in Tables 5, 6 and 7. New regressions related to the ‘large’ 
target group are listed in Tables 18, 19 and 20, those of the ‘small’ target group are displayed in 
Tables 21, 22 and 23. In the small target group, a target’s aggregate ESG score is positively and 
significantly related to the target’s CAR in (-1, 1). The governance pillar score has a positive 
and significant relationship with the target’s CAR in (-20, 20), and the social pillar score is 
negatively and significantly associated with the target’s CAR in the (2, 20) window. When it 
comes to the large target group, only the governance pillar is positively and significantly 
related to the target’s CAR and portfolio CAR. Thus, we conclude that small targets’ ESG 
factors have an extensive and broader impact on their CAR than large targets, which may help 
to explain why our results in subsection 5.1.1 show a less significant impact than our 
expectations.  
We also check the year and industry distributions of large and small target groups. The results 
are displayed in Tables 24 and 25, respectively. The year distributions of two groups are similar, 
while the large size group contains a higher proportion of targets in the manufacturing industry. 
Thus, we picked up those observations from the manufacturing industry as a separate group 
and re-ran the regressions in Tables 5, 6 and 7 (regression tables are not displayed in the paper 
but available upon request). We find that the aggregate ESG scores of manufacturer targets are 
positively related to the TCAR and PCAR. Their governance pillar scores are significantly and 
positively associated with TCAR and PCAR in the same event windows as the large group.  
However, what leads to the difference in other factors? As mentioned, large and institutional 
investors will pay more attention to a firm’s ESG factors because they own a piece of the total 
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economy and seek long-term, enduring economic growth. Thus, we collect the institutional 
block holding data of both large and small sample groups from their proxy statements one year 
before the announcement date in Edgar. These institutional investors are also blockholders of 
the firm. Three targets in the small target group have no related proxy statements or no related 
data; all the targets in large target group have the data required. 
Then, we test whether the mean of institutional percentage of two groups are significantly 
different. The results of the t-test are presented in Table 26. The results suggest that small 
targets have a higher proportion of institutional holding on average than large targets, which is 
consistent with the statement at the beginning of this paragraph. 
To sum up, in this section, we prove that targets in IVA database are larger firms with better 
performance. Good performance leads to less emphasis on ESG factors. Larger firm size is 
associated with lower institutional holding percentage, which also means less care on ESG 
factors. These two characteristics of firms in the IVA database may partly result in the less 
significant results we obtain in Section 5, especially subsection 5.1.1. Besides, these features 
may indicate that our results and conclusions in section 5 may not be as applicable to smaller 
targets and mergers in earlier years as to the larger targets and latest mergers. 
7. Conclusions 
We examine how the target’s and acquirer’s ESG information influences their market returns 
and total market returns during the merger announcement periods by adopting a new database, 
MSCI ESG Research Intangible Value Assessment (IVA). We find that the target’s aggregate 
ESG performance has a positive, though not always significant, impact on the synergistic 
market returns 3 days around the announcement date, yet no significant influence on the target 
market returns. We also demonstrate that the acquirer’s good aggregate ESG performance 
increases its market performance. From the aspects of each pillar of ESG, we prove that the 
target’s governance strength and the acquirer’s social strength are preferred by the market. 
These results do not fully support our Hypothesis 1 that the target’s ESG strength increases 
market returns of itself and the total. Another result that was inconsistent with our hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2) is that if the acquirer’s ESG (E, S or G) performance is better than the target’s, 
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there is no significant higher synergistic market value around the announcement date.  
If we view the ESG score as a measure of risk exposure and corresponding risk managerial 
ability on ESG issues, our evidence supports Hypothesis 3 that an acquirer with a high ESG 
risk exposure and incommensurate managerial ability will suffer from lower acquirer and total 
market returns. 
When searching for the reason for the less significant target-related results than our 
expectations, we show that targets in the IVA database are larger in size and perform better due 
to the methodology of the database. We find two possible explanations for the less significant 
results. First, good performance results in less emphasis on a firm’s ESG information. Second, 
larger firms tend to have fewer institutional blockholders, who pay more attention to the ESG 
information of the company. These findings may also suggest that our main results about 
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Panel A Target returns, acquirer returns and portfolio returns 
TCAR  Target cumulated abnormal return in event window 
PCAR 4-week-announcement-prior market value weighted cumulated abnormal 
return of target and acquirer 
ACAR Acquirer cumulated abnormal return 
  Panel B Target and acquirer characteristics 
Premium Premium of offer price to target trading price four weeks prior to the 
announcement date 
Target ESG score0-3 Dummy variable: equals 1 if target ESG industry adjusted score belongs 
to [0,3]; else equals 0 
Target ESG score7-10 Dummy variable: equals 1 if target ESG industry adjusted score belongs 
to [7,10]; else equals 0 
Target ESG score Aggregate ESG Industry adjusted score of target 
Target E score Environmental pillar score of target 
Target S score Social pillar score of target 
Target G score Governance pillar score of target 
Target size Logarithm of target market capital ($mil) 4 weeks prior to announcement  
Acquirer size Logarithm of acquirer market capital ($mil) 4 weeks prior to 
announcement  
Q Tobin's Q: market value of assets over book value of assets:(Total assets- 
Total common/ordinary equity+ common shares outstanding x Fiscal 
annual closing price )÷ Total assets 
Leverage Book value of debts over book value of assets: (Total debt in current 
liabilities+ Total long-term debt)÷total assets  
  




ROA Operating income before depreciation ÷ total assets 
Institutional Total percentage of target's stock held by institutional investors who are 
also the blockholders (≥5%) of the target. 
Acquirer ESG score0-3 Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer ESG industry adjusted score 
belongs to [0,3]; else equals 0 
Acquirer ESG 
score7-10 
Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer ESG industry adjusted score 
belongs to [7,10]; else equals 0 
Acquirer ESG score Aggregate ESG Industry adjusted score of acquirer 
Acquirer E score Environmental pillar score of acquirer 
Acquirer S score Social pillar score of acquirer 
Acquirer G score Governance pillar score of acquirer 
A>T ESG score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's ESG  industry adjusted score > 
target's ESG  industry adjusted score, else equals 0 
A<T ESG score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's ESG  industry adjusted score < 
target's ESG  industry adjusted score, else equals 0 
A>T E score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's environmental pillar score > 
target's environmental pillar score, else equals 0 
A<T E score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's environmental pillar score > 
target's environmental pillar score, else equals 0 
A>T S score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's social pillar score > target's social 
pillar score, else equals 0 
A<T S score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's social pillar score < target's social 
pillar score, else equals 0 
A>T G score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's governance pillar score > target's 
governance pillar score, else equals 0 
A<T G score Dummy variable: equals 1 if acquirer's governance pillar score < target's 
governance pillar score, else equals 0 
  Variable Definition 
Panel C Deal characteristics 
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Tender offer Dummy variable: Equals 1 if the deal is a tender offer, else equals 0 
Target hi-tech flag 
Dummy variable: Equals 1 if the target is from high-tech industry, else 
equals 0 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 
Dummy variable: Equals 1 if the acquirer is from high-tech industry, else 
equals 0 
Pure cash Dummy variable: Equals 1 if the payment of deal is all cash, else equals 0 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of cumulated abnormal returns 
Statistics in this table are based on our largest sample group A, in which mergers from SDC are 
matched with IVA data only by the targets. No financial data from Compustat is contained in sample 
group A. Its sample size is 128 observations. TCAR represents for cumulated abnormal return of the 
target in the event window around the announcement date. ACAR represents for the cumulated 
abnormal return of the acquirer in the event window around the announcement date. PCAR 
represents for the market capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal return of acquirer and target 
in the event window around the announcement date. 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
TCAR(-20,-2) 0.035 0.028 0.477 -0.29 0.12 
TCAR(-1,1) 0.237 0.214 2.308 -0.248 0.27 
TCAR(2,20) 0.001 -0.001 0.302 -0.166 0.066 
TCAR(-20,20) 0.273 0.239 2.524 -0.301 0.314 
ACAR(-20,-2) 0.006 0.000 0.262 -0.217 0.070 
ACAR(-1,1) 0.015 0.005 0.303 -0.278 0.086 
ACAR(2,20) -0.007 -0.009 0.55 -0.204 0.09 
ACAR(-20,20) 0.013 -0.002 0.569 -0.329 0.150 
PCAR(-20,-2) 0.009 0.008 0.226 -0.202 0.069 
PCAR(-1,1) 0.049 0.035 0.281 -0.258 0.085 
PCAR(2,20) -0.006 -0.006 0.315 -0.188 0.069 




Table 2 Summary statistics of ESG scores 
Statistics in Panel A are based on our largest sample group A, in which mergers from SDC are 
matched with IVA data only by the targets. Statistics in Panel B use the sample group B, in which 
observations contain both target’s IVA data and acquirer’s IVA data. Sample group A and B include 
no target’s financial data from Compustat. The sample sizes of Sample group A and B are 128 and 
115 respectively. ESG score represents for the aggregate industry adjusted score of three pillars. E 
score represents the environmental pillar score; S score represents for the social pillar score; G score 
represents the governmental pillar score. A>T(A<T) ESG (E, S or G) score is a dummy variable. It 
equals 1 when acquirer’s ESG (E, S or G) score is larger (smaller) than the target’s, else equals 0. 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
Panel A 
     
Target ESG score 4.072 3.7 10 0 2.027 
Target E score 4.338 3.8 10 0 2.271 
Target S score 4.209 4.15 8.2 0.5 1.655 
Target G score 5.887 5.3 10 1 2.737 
 
     
Panel B 
     
Acquirer ESG score 4.503 4.8 10 0 2.18 
Acquirer E score 5.172 5 10 0 2.297 
Acquirer S score 4.188 4.25 9.6 0 1.548 
Acquirer G score 6.133 5.65 10 0 2.98 
Acquirer size 9.033 8.985 12.411 5.68 1.6 
A>T ESG score 0.574 1 1 0 0.497 
A<T ESG score 0.374 0 1 0 0.486 
A>T E score 0.574 1 1 0 0.497 
A<T E score 0.4 0 1 0 0.492 
A>T S score 0.47 0 1 0 0.501 
A<T S score 0.409 0 1 0 0.494 
A>T G score 0.53 1 1 0 0.501 




Table 3 Summary statistics of merger characteristics and target’s financial data 
Statistics in Panel A are based on our largest sample group A, in which mergers from SDC are 
matched with IVA data only by the targets. Statistics in Panel B use the sample group C, which is 
constructed by matching target’s financial data from Compustat with sample group A. The sample 
sizes of Sample group A and C are 128 and 54 respectively. Target size equals to the logarithm of 
target market capital ($mil) 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Premium is the ratio of offer 
price to target trading price four weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
Panel A           
Premium  40.1% 31.2% 347.1% -13.3% 0.444 
Tender offer 0.227 0 1 0 0.42 
Target hi-tech flag 0.523 1 1 0 0.501 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.547 1 1 0 0.5 
Pure cash 0.422 0 1 0 0.496 
Target size 7.36 7.304 11.02 4.544 1.451 
      
Panel B           
ROA 0.124 0.121 0.596 -0.127 0.099 
Q 1.893 1.497 6.815 0.887 1.007 





Table 4 Sample distributions by year or industry of the targets 
Statistics are based on our largest sample group A, in which mergers from SDC are matched with 
IVA data only by the target. Neither target’s financial data nor acquirer’s IVA data is included in 
sample group A. The sample size is 128 observations. Industry is defined according to two-digit SIC 
code. 
Panel A 
   
Panel B 
  




 Industry Num. of 
mergers 
% of sample 
2000 1 0.78% 
 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1 0.78% 
2003 1 0.78% 
 
Mining 4 3.13% 
2004 1 0.78% 
 
Construction 1 0.78% 
2005 1 0.78% 
 
Manufacturing 66 51.56% 
2006 3 2.34% 
 
Transportation and communication 11 8.59% 
2007 5 3.91% 
 
Wholesale 5 3.91% 
2008 2 1.56% 
 
Retail 9 7.03% 
2010 1 0.78% 
 
Real estate 9 7.03% 
2011 3 2.34% 
 
Service 22 17.19% 
2012 9 7.03% 
 
Total 128 100.00% 


















Table 5 Target aggregate ESG performance and target cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of target’s aggregate ESG level on target cumulated abnormal 
returns (TCAR). The event windows of the TCARs are shown in the third line of the table. Industry 
control variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fishery; and 
industry control variable transportation represents the industry section of transportation and 
communication. Other industry controls include construction, manufacturing, wholesale and real 
estate for columns (1) to (4); manufacturing, wholesale and real estate for columns (5) to (8). 
Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, **, 




Table 5 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target ESG score -0.008  0.006  -0.002  -0.005  -0.007  0.027  <0.001  0.020  
 
(0.17) (0.489) (0.459) (0.656) (0.621) (0.126) (0.969) (0.359) 
Premium 0.081***  0.414***  -0.013***  0.483***  0.168  -0.054  0.052  0.166  
 
(0.003) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.109) (0.687) (0.222) (0.325) 
Tender offer 0.004  0.050  -0.002  0.052  0.104  -0.133  0.046  0.016  
 
(0.900) (0.235) (0.888) (0.320) (0.308) (0.314) (0.281) (0.921) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.016  0.076  0.009  0.069  0.008  0.051  -0.078**  -0.019*  
 
(0.650) (0.123) (0.616) (0.252) (0.927) (0.667) (0.045) (0.900) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.018  -0.068  -0.016  -0.066  0.043  0.098  0.065  0.206  
 
(0.609) (0.173) (0.388) (0.282) (0.651) (0.426) (0.104) (0.188) 
Pure cash 0.006  0.038  -0.001  0.043  0.066  0.132  0.020  0.219**  
 
(0.804) (0.293) (0.917) (0.335) (0.245) (0.075) (0.380) (0.022) 
Target size 0.009  -0.019  -0.009**  -0.019  <0.001  -0.021  -0.004  -0.025  
 
(0.244) (0.103) (0.028) (0.185) (0.989) (0.347) (0.553) (0.375) 
Q 
    
-0.017  -0.062  0.008  -0.071*  
     
(0.507) (0.067) (0.452) (0.095) 
Leverage 
    
0.078  0.376***  -0.040  0.414**  
     
(0.470) (0.010) (0.366) (0.023) 
ROA 
    
0.240  0.171  -0.114  0.297  
 
    
(0.428)  (0.663)  (0.365)  (0.548)  
Agriculture -0.064  0.038  0.100  0.074  0.012  -0.037  0.119*  0.094  
 
(0.608) (0.831) (0.127) (0.733) (0.940) (0.861) (0.089) (0.728) 
Mining 0.060  -0.005  0.109***  0.164  0.034  0.272  -0.033  0.274  
 
(0.386) (0.957) (0.004) (0.180) (0.866) (0.307) (0.699) (0.414) 
Transportation -0.047  -0.110*  0.032  -0.125  -0.013  -0.043  0.048  -0.008  
 
(0.300) (0.093) (0.188) (0.119) (0.883) (0.703) (0.187) (0.957) 
Retail -0.067  -0.074  -0.020  -0.160*  -0.091  0.117  -0.034  -0.008  
 
(0.187) (0.309) (0.464) (0.073) (0.412) (0.414) (0.454) (0.965) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.013  0.172*  0.077**  0.236*  -0.064  0.132  0.009  0.078  
 
(0.852) (0.091) (0.042) (0.060) (0.695) (0.534) (0.889) (0.772) 





Table 6 Target aggregate ESG performance and portfolio cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of target’s aggregate ESG level on market capital weighted 
portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR). The event windows of the PCARs are shown in the 
third line of the table. Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry section of 
agriculture, forestry and fishery. Other industry controls include construction, transportation and 
communication, wholesale, retail and real estate for columns (1) to (4); transportation and 
communication, wholesale, retail and real estate for columns (4) to (8). Variable definitions are 
displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 




Table 6 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target ESG score -0.003  0.009**  -0.004  0.002  -0.003  0.008  -0.009  -0.004  
 
(0.424) (0.028) (0.234) (0.753) (0.679) (0.325) (0.209) (0.763) 
Premium -0.005  -0.009  -0.005  -0.019  0.079  0.039  -0.013  0.105  
 
(0.773) (0.618) (0.722) (0.52) (0.138) (0.521) (0.812) (0.319) 
Tender offer 0.003  -0.012  -0.006  -0.015  0.011  0.030  -0.003  0.038  
 
(0.889) (0.569) (0.711) (0.644) (0.824) (0.623) (0.952) (0.715) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.010  0.012  0.037*  0.058  -0.020  0.060  -0.015  0.025  
 
(0.637) (0.610) (0.063) (0.130) (0.671) (0.270) (0.754) (0.788) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.004  -0.022  -0.030  -0.048  <0.001  -0.018  0.003  -0.016  
 
(0.834) (0.352) (0.130) (0.219) (0.992) (0.745) (0.961) (0.866) 
Pure cash 0.004  0.004  -0.002  0.006  0.023  0.018  -0.016  0.025  
 
(0.809) (0.811) (0.906) (0.828) (0.417) (0.594) (0.598) (0.660) 
Target size 0.002  -0.018  <0.001  -0.016*  0.007  -0.023**  0.009  -0.007  
 
(0.619) (0.001) (0.934) (0.070) (0.44) (0.031) (0.324) (0.699) 
Q 
    
-0.016  -0.010  -0.014  -0.041  
     
(0.218) (0.522) (0.303) (0.128) 
Leverage 
    
-0.008  0.166**  -0.013  0.144  
     
(0.887) (0.013) (0.816) (0.192) 
ROA 
    
0.185  0.061  -0.062  0.183  
 
    
(0.237)  (0.735)  (0.702)  (0.553)  
Agriculture 0.040  -0.002  0.121*  0.159  0.073  -0.047  0.099  0.125  
 
(0.596) (0.979) (0.088) (0.252) (0.388) (0.635) (0.270) (0.459) 
Mining 0.044  0.029  0.128***  0.200**  0.056  0.088  -0.049  0.095  
 
(0.295) (0.546) (0.002) (0.011) (0.592) (0.468) (0.654) (0.649) 
Manufacturing -0.007  0.037*  0.018  0.048  0.011  -0.018  0.017  0.010  
 
(0.707) (0.079) (0.299) (0.161) (0.738) (0.645) (0.642) (0.885) 
Other industry 
controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.002  0.137***  -0.005  0.131*  -0.066  0.129  0.003  0.066  
 
(0.971) (0.005) (0.904) (0.100) (0.436) (0.191) (0.977) (0.694) 





Table 7 Target respective ESG pillar performance and target cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of target’s E, S or G pillar levels on target cumulated abnormal returns (TCAR) respectively. The event windows 
of the TCARs are shown in the third line of the table. E, S, G pillar represent environmental pillar, social pillar and governance pillar respectively. 
Regressions in panel A are based on sample group A, in which mergers from SDC are matched with IVA data only by the targets. Regressions in Panel B 
are based on sample group C, which is constructed by matching target’s financial data from Compustat with sample group A. Industry control variable 
agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fishery. Industry control variable transportation represents the industry section of 
transportation and communication. Other industry controls in Panel A include agriculture, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and real estate. 
Industry controls in Panel B include agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale, retail and real estate. Variable definitions are 
displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent TCAR 
Variable (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score -0.006  0.010  -0.001  0.003  
        
 
(0.324) (0.221) (0.792) (0.743) 
        Target G score 
   
0.007*  0.003  0.002  0.012*  
    
     
(0.096) (0.597) (0.319) (0.082) 
    Target S score 
        
-0.010  -0.003  -0.004  -0.017  
         
(0.147) (0.767) (0.207) (0.146) 
Premium 0.088***  0.450***  -0.011  0.527***  0.077***  0.459***  -0.013  0.523***  0.076***  0.422***  -0.014  0.484***  
 
(0.003) (<0.001) (0.476) (<0.001) (0.007) (<0.001) (0.381) (<0.001) (0.005) (<0.001) (0.316) (<0.001) 
Tender offer -0.002  0.047  -0.003  0.042  0.003  0.036  -0.003  0.036  0.006  0.048  -0.002  0.053  
 
(0.95) (0.261) (0.84) (0.416) (0.928) (0.383) (0.855) (0.472) (0.833) (0.257) (0.919) (0.307) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.018  0.068  0.008  0.058  -0.020  0.078  0.008  0.065  -0.015  0.083  0.010  0.077  
 
(0.61) (0.153) (0.675) (0.321) (0.549) (0.1) (0.668) (0.254) (0.653) (0.095) (0.569) (0.198) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.025  -0.074  -0.015  -0.064  0.017  -0.067  -0.016  -0.066  0.016  -0.070  -0.017  -0.071  
 
(0.488) (0.133) (0.435) (0.292) (0.633) (0.172) (0.379) (0.261) (0.652) (0.164) (0.353) (0.245) 
Pure cash 0.005  0.028  -0.002  0.031  -0.002  0.024  -0.004  0.017  0.003  0.036  -0.003  0.036  
 
(0.847) (0.424) (0.883) (0.473) (0.93) (0.501) (0.751) (0.685) (0.898) (0.324) (0.824) (0.413) 
Target size 0.009  -0.025**  -0.010**  -0.026*  0.002  -0.022*  -0.012***  -0.031**  0.006  -0.017  -0.010**  -0.021  
 
(0.307) (0.032) (0.022) (0.063) (0.774) (0.053) (0.008) (0.023) (0.428) (0.127) (0.012) (0.119) 
Mining 0.068  -0.009  0.111***  0.169  0.078  -0.001  0.114***  0.191  0.057  -0.012  0.106***  0.152  
 
(0.33) (0.922) (0.003) (0.151) (0.26) (0.989) (0.002) (0.103) (0.411) (0.905) (0.004) (0.211) 
Transportation -0.035  -0.121*  0.035  -0.121  -0.031  -0.117*  0.036  -0.112  -0.045  -0.121**  0.031  -0.135*  
 
(0.438) (0.052) (0.141) (0.114) (0.489) (0.062) (0.125) (0.139) (0.323) (0.063) (0.194) (0.089) 
Retail -0.057  -0.085  -0.017  -0.159  -0.068  -0.081  -0.020  -0.170  -0.066  -0.080  -0.020  -0.166*  
 
(0.267) (0.225) (0.522) (0.067) (0.18) (0.248) (0.453) (0.048) (0.195) (0.271) (0.45) (0.062) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.022  0.196**  0.075**  0.249**  -0.032  0.199**  0.072  0.239**  0.021  0.198*  0.095**  0.315**  
 
(0.76) (0.045) (0.047) (0.039) (0.653) (0.044) (0.054) (0.045) (0.788) (0.078) (0.021) (0.022) 
Num.of obs. 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 128 128 128 128 
Table 7 (continued) 
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Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent TCAR 
variable (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score -0.012 0.035** 0.007 0.031 
        
 
(0.379) (0.043) (0.173) (0.155) 
        Target G score 
   
0.022** -0.006 0.004 0.02 
    
     
(0.033) (0.674) (0.367) (0.25) 
    Target S score 
        
-0.009 0.019 -0.008 0.002 
         
(0.518) (0.315) (0.192) (0.924) 
Premium 0.177* -0.063 0.035 0.149 0.178* 0.008 0.057 0.243 0.167* -0.017 0.065 0.214 
 
(0.085) (0.625) (0.39) (0.361) (0.059) (0.948) (0.161) (0.131) (0.100) (0.895) (0.113) (0.199) 
Tender offer 0.095 -0.099 0.047 0.043 0.039 -0.091 0.035 -0.017 0.105 -0.122 0.051 0.034 
 
(0.345) (0.440) (0.249) (0.788) (0.688) (0.514) (0.415) (0.921) (0.302) (0.364) (0.214) (0.838) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.019 0.027 -0.091** -0.044 -0.054 0.101 -0.088** -0.042 -0.001 0.088 -0.079** 0.008 
 
(0.833) (0.816) (0.019) (0.765) (0.539) (0.422) (0.026) (0.784) (0.991) (0.461) (0.034) (0.960) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.046 0.081 0.066* 0.194 0.073 0.068 0.07* 0.211 0.05 0.071 0.067* 0.188 
 
(0.619) (0.496) (0.086) (0.204) (0.412) (0.592) (0.079) (0.175) (0.59) (0.57) (0.085) (0.231) 
Pure cash 0.061 0.14* 0.028 0.229** 0.075 0.103 0.021 0.199** 0.064 0.122 0.013 0.199** 
 
(0.278) (0.054) (0.213) (0.015) (0.148) (0.161) (0.346) (0.029) (0.255) (0.106) (0.553) (0.037) 
Target size 0.004 -0.03 -0.008 -0.034 -0.012 -0.009 -0.006 -0.026 -0.001 -0.015 -0.003 -0.018 
 
(0.821) (0.193) (0.259) (0.241) (0.474) (0.704) (0.394) (0.347) (0.975) (0.507) (0.663) (0.513) 
Q -0.021 -0.053 0.012 -0.062 -0.019 -0.071** 0.007 -0.082* -0.02 -0.061* 0.004 -0.077 
 
(0.419) (0.119) (0.257) (0.15) (0.438) (0.042) (0.475) (0.053) (0.454) (0.085) (0.71) (0.083) 
Leverage 0.072 0.384*** -0.031 0.425** 0.077 0.344** -0.042 0.379** 0.074 0.367** -0.05 0.391** 
 
(0.499) (0.007) (0.472) (0.018) (0.444) (0.019) (0.338) (0.033) (0.493) (0.013) (0.252) (0.033) 
ROA 0.263 0.115 -0.137 0.241 0.173 0.235 -0.124 0.284 0.233 0.211 -0.11 0.333 
 
(0.385) (0.765) (0.269) (0.622) (0.544) (0.561) (0.319) (0.563) (0.44) (0.597) (0.367) (0.505) 
Industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.059 0.132 -0.004 0.07 -0.105 0.199 0.004 0.098 -0.037 0.106 0.043 0.112 
 
(0.715) (0.521) (0.957) (0.79) (0.489) (0.36) (0.949) (0.709) (0.829) (0.644) (0.538) (0.696) 
Num.of obs. 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
39 
 
Table 8 Target respective ESG pillar performance and portfolio cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of target’s E, S or G pillar levels on the market capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) 
respectively. The event windows of the PCARs are shown in the third line of the table. E, S, G pillar represent environmental pillar, Social pillar and 
Governance pillar respectively. Regressions in panel A are based on sample group A, in which mergers from SDC are matched with IVA data only by the 
targets. Regressions in Panel B is based on sample group C, which is constructed by matching target financial data from Compustat with sample group A. 
Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fishery. Other industry controls in Panel A include 
construction, manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale, retail and real estate. Industry controls in Panel B include agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale, retail and real estate. Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The 




Table 8 (continued) 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent PCAR 
variable (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score -0.001  0.005  -0.002  0.003  
        
 
(0.874) (0.223) (0.644) (0.663) 
        Target G score 
   
0.001  0.003  0.003  0.008  
    
     
(0.572) (0.310) (0.191) (0.106) 
    Target S score 
        
-0.002  0.007  -0.002  0.003  
         
(0.582) (0.123) (0.629) (0.681) 
Premium -0.005  -0.006  -0.003  -0.015  -0.006  -0.003  -0.007  -0.016  -0.007  -0.002  -0.009  -0.018  
 
(0.779) (0.75) (0.85) (0.655) (0.71) (0.886) (0.68) (0.612) (0.66) (0.91) (0.544) (0.535) 
Tender offer 0.002  -0.009  -0.008  -0.015  0.003  -0.015  -0.007  -0.019  0.003  -0.014  -0.005  -0.016  
 
(0.899) (0.665) (0.653) (0.666) (0.885) (0.467) (0.685) (0.557) (0.847) (0.478) (0.774) (0.63) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.008  0.015  0.034  0.057  0.008  0.020  0.034*  0.062  0.009  0.014  0.035*  0.058  
 
(0.708) (0.537) (0.084) (0.141) (0.705) (0.394) (0.081) (0.101) (0.663) (0.548) (0.08) (0.132) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.005  -0.028  -0.028  -0.050  0.004  -0.025  -0.031  -0.051  0.004  -0.021  -0.030  -0.047  
 
(0.799) (0.261) (0.169) (0.205) (0.837) (0.31) (0.126) (0.189) (0.847) (0.384) (0.132) (0.227) 
Pure cash 0.004  0.003  -0.002  0.005  0.002  0.000  -0.006  -0.004  0.003  0.006  -0.002  0.007  
 
(0.819) (0.843) (0.868) (0.871) (0.897) (0.999) (0.698) (0.897) (0.838) (0.737) (0.896) (0.802) 
Target size 0.002  -0.018***  -0.001  -0.017*  0.001  -0.017***  -0.004  -0.020**  0.001  -0.015***  -0.002  -0.016*  
 
(0.757) (0.003) (0.762) (0.061) (0.911) (0.003) (0.422) (0.027) (0.773) (0.006) (0.694) (0.078) 
Agriculture 0.042  -0.015  0.126*  0.153  0.037  -0.013  0.114  0.138  0.035  0.012  0.118  0.165  
 
(0.581) (0.86) (0.079) (0.274) (0.629) (0.884) (0.11) (0.318) (0.64) (0.892) (0.101) (0.237) 
Mining 0.046  0.021  0.131***  0.198**  0.049  0.027  0.136***  0.212***  0.044  0.029  0.129***  0.201*  
 
(0.274) (0.662) (0.001) (0.012) (0.252) (0.571) (0.001) (0.007) (0.297) (0.548) (0.002) (0.01) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.006  0.151***  -0.009  0.136*  -0.007  0.151***  -0.013  0.130*  0.004  0.118**  -0.003  0.119  
 
(0.893) (0.002) (0.814) (0.086) (0.862) (0.003) (0.739) (0.096) (0.926) (0.03) (0.945) (0.172) 




Table 8 (continued) 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent PCAR 
variable (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score -0.005  0.000  0.004  -0.001  
        
 
(0.486) (0.994) (0.617) (0.933) 
        Target G score 
    
0.011**  0.001  0.005  0.017  
    
     
(0.040) (0.93) (0.351) (0.115) 
    Target S score 
        
0.001  0.002  -0.009  -0.006  
         
(0.877) (0.796) (0.229) (0.681) 
Premium 0.082  0.060  -0.045  0.097  0.085*  0.060  -0.030  0.115  0.070  0.056  -0.020  0.105  
 
(0.116) (0.331) (0.421) (0.35) (0.078) (0.309) (0.572) (0.236) (0.178) (0.357) (0.704) (0.306) 
Tender offer 0.008  0.037  -0.011  0.034  -0.020  0.036  -0.026  -0.011  0.008  0.035  -0.005  0.038  
 
(0.882) (0.54) (0.838) (0.744) (0.694) (0.57) (0.642) (0.919) (0.879) (0.561) (0.929) (0.709) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.016  0.071  -0.033  0.022  -0.050  0.069  -0.041  -0.021  -0.023  0.071  -0.028  0.019  
 
(0.741) (0.209) (0.512) (0.818) (0.272) (0.223) (0.427) (0.817) (0.611) (0.195) (0.562) (0.833) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.001  -0.025  0.011  -0.013  0.014  -0.024  0.017  0.006  0.002  -0.026  0.012  -0.011  
 
(0.982) (0.657) (0.829) (0.893) (0.757) (0.668) (0.748) (0.947) (0.971) (0.651) (0.807) (0.905) 
Pure cash 0.021  0.009  -0.002  0.028  0.027  0.009  -0.006  0.031  0.027  0.012  -0.015  0.024  
 
(0.453) (0.782) (0.938) (0.620) (0.300) (0.773) (0.847) (0.562) (0.341) (0.733) (0.617) (0.676) 
Target size 0.008  -0.020*  0.004  -0.008  0.001  -0.020  0.004  -0.016  0.006  -0.020  0.008  -0.007  
 
(0.367) (0.072) (0.692) (0.676) (0.887) (0.056) (0.703) (0.363) (0.516) (0.049) (0.405) (0.672) 
Q -0.018  -0.013  -0.009  -0.040  -0.017  -0.013  -0.012  -0.042*  -0.015  -0.011  -0.016  -0.042  
 
(0.185) (0.429) (0.525) (0.145) (0.165) (0.41) (0.382) (0.100) (0.279) (0.478) (0.259) (0.122) 
Leverage -0.010  0.156**  0.003  0.148  -0.009  0.155**  -0.004  0.142  -0.003  0.159**  -0.014  0.142  
 
(0.857) (0.02) (0.964) (0.181) (0.863) (0.019) (0.944) (0.179) (0.962) (0.018) (0.806) (0.202) 
ROA 0.194  0.075  -0.090  0.179  0.152  0.074  -0.093  0.134  0.179  0.074  -0.074  0.179  
 
(0.215) (0.68) (0.589) (0.565) (0.300) (0.685) (0.574) (0.654) (0.251) (0.683) (0.648) (0.562) 
Industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.064  0.146  -0.024  0.059  -0.085  0.145  -0.024  0.036  -0.077  0.136  0.024  0.084  
 
(0.443) (0.141) (0.790) (0.724) (0.281) (0.141) (0.784) (0.820) (0.390) (0.197) (0.794) (0.637) 
Num.of obs. 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
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Table 9 Acquirer aggregate ESG performance and cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the acquirer’s aggregate ESG level on the acquirer 
cumulated abnormal returns (ACAR) in columns (1) to (4), and on the market capital weighted 
portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) in columns (5) to (8). Event windows of ACAR 
(PCAR) are shown in the third line of the table. Industry control variable agriculture represents the 
industry section of agriculture, forestry and fishery; and industry control variable transportation 
represents the industry section of transportation and communication. Other industry controls include 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail. Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The 





Table 9 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Acquirer ESG score 0.002  0.004  0.005  0.011*  0.002  0.003  0.005  0.009  
 
(0.583) (0.263) (0.249) (0.093) (0.653) (0.461) (0.138) (0.107) 
Premium 0.014  0.158***  0.001  0.173**  0.042  0.298***  0.000  0.340***  
 
(0.739) (0.001) (0.992) (0.031) (0.321) (<0.001) (0.994) (<0.001) 
Tender offer -0.016  0.003  -0.001  -0.014  -0.008  0.020  0.001  0.013  
 
(0.453) (0.901) (0.979) (0.732) (0.697) (0.326) (0.970) (0.705) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.000  -0.019  0.004  -0.015  0.018  -0.005  0.012  0.024  
 
(0.994) (0.274) (0.84) (0.630) (0.293) (0.746) (0.445) (0.357) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.022  -0.013  0.020  0.029  0.025  -0.014  0.024  0.036  
 
(0.355) (0.615) (0.494) (0.511) (0.280) (0.540) (0.272) (0.336) 
Pure cash 0.009  0.011  -0.036  -0.016  0.001  0.017  -0.032  -0.014  
 
(0.710) (0.658) (0.225) (0.716) (0.960) (0.451) (0.148) (0.711) 
Acquirer size 0.011  0.051***  <0.001  0.062  0.006  0.022  0.003  0.032  
 
(0.462) (0.002) (0.998) (0.032) (0.694) (0.135) (0.815) (0.192) 
Agriculture -0.008  -0.021***  -0.004  -0.033***  -0.009  -0.030***  -0.005  -0.044***  
 
(0.130) (<0.001) (0.548) (0.001) (0.074) (<0.001) (0.265) (<0.001) 
Mining 0.125*  -0.036  0.101  0.190  0.082  -0.019  0.111  0.174  
 
(0.098) (0.656) (0.289) (0.185) (0.280) (0.793) (0.122) (0.149) 
Construction 0.080**  0.017  0.095*  0.192**  0.077*  -0.003  0.110***  0.184***  
 
(0.049) (0.703) (0.064) (0.014) (0.059) (0.942) (0.005) (0.005) 
Transportation 0.036*  0.006  0.011  0.053  0.028  -0.012  0.016  0.032  
 
(0.07) (0.777) (0.669) (0.161) (0.167) (0.541) (0.398) (0.315) 
Real estate 0.077**  0.015  0.032  0.124*  0.050  -0.006  0.020  0.064  
 
(0.026) (0.687) (0.464) (0.060) (0.152) (0.858) (0.533) (0.242) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept 0.069  -0.066  -0.029  -0.025  0.059  -0.084  -0.016  -0.040  
 
(0.147) (0.200) (0.632) (0.779) (0.218) (0.072) (0.727) (0.592) 





Table 10 Acquirer respective ESG pillar performance and acquirer cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the acquirer’s E, S or G pillar levels on the acquirer portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (ACAR) respectively. 
Event windows of ACAR are shown in the third line of the table. E, S, G pillar represent environmental pillar, social pillar and governance pillar 
respectively. Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fishery. Other industry controls include 
construction, transportation and communication, wholesale and real estate. Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given 




Table 10 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Acquirer E score 0.002  0.004  <0.001  0.006  
        
 
(0.58) (0.313) (0.956) (0.374) 
        Acquirer G score 
   
0.001  0.000  -0.004 -0.003  
    
     
(0.777) (0.947) (0.217) (0.528) 
    Acquirer S score 
       
-0.001 0.008  0.011*  0.018**  
         
(0.771) (0.123) (0.058) (0.049) 
Premium -0.018  -0.001  <0.001  -0.019  -0.016  0.006  -0.001  -0.010  -0.016  0.006  0.001  -0.009  
 
(0.405) (0.957) (0.99) (0.637) (0.455) (0.777) (0.974) (0.799) (0.446) (0.774) (0.978) (0.822) 
Tender offer <0.001 -0.020 0.001 -0.019  -0.003  -0.018  0.006  -0.015  -0.002  -0.015  0.006  -0.011  
 
(0.995) (0.257) (0.954) (0.547) (0.879) (0.321) (0.789) (0.647) (0.884) (0.404) (0.762) (0.730) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.020  -0.016  0.017  0.022  0.022  -0.017  0.010  0.015  0.021  -0.016  0.019  0.024  
 
(0.385) (0.532) (0.564) (0.628) (0.353) (0.499) (0.745) (0.747) (0.380) (0.522) (0.516) (0.590) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.008 0.009  -0.036  -0.019  0.008  0.008  -0.031  -0.015  0.009  0.008  -0.037  -0.019  
 
(0.746) (0.722) (0.230) (0.667) (0.724) (0.746) (0.293) (0.742) (0.692) (0.742) (0.212) (0.663) 
Pure cash 0.010  0.050***  -0.001 0.060**  0.011  0.054***  -0.003  0.062**  0.010  0.054***  <0.001  0.064**  
 
(0.491) (0.003) (0.974) (0.043) (0.486) (0.001) (0.893) (0.037) (0.502) (0.001) (0.99) (0.029) 
Acquirer size -0.008  -0.021***  -0.001  -0.030***  -0.006  -0.020***  -0.001  -0.027***  -0.006  -0.020***  -0.002  -0.029***  
 
(0.130) (<0.001) (0.873) (0.003) (0.180) (<0.001) (0.813) (0.003) (0.184) (<0.001) (0.737) (0.002) 
Agriculture 0.125*  -0.037  0.104  0.192  0.123  -0.034  0.123  0.212 0.133* -0.074  0.045  0.104  
 
(0.099) (0.652) (0.280) (0.186) (0.111) (0.680) (0.206) (0.151) (0.096) (0.382) (0.653) (0.486) 
Mining 0.079**  0.012  0.083  0.174**  0.077*  0.007  0.076  0.159**  0.076*  0.005  0.080  0.160**  
 
(0.050) (0.772) (0.102) (0.024) (0.056) (0.866) (0.135) (0.039) (0.058) (0.909) (0.108) (0.033) 
Manufacturing 0.036  0.006 0.006  0.048  0.033  0.004 0.014  0.051 0.034  0.004  0.007 0.045  
 
(0.069) (0.789) (0.796) (0.204) (0.106) (0.844) (0.593) (0.191) (0.085) (0.832) (0.790) (0.226) 
Retail 0.077  0.015 0.028 0.120*  0.074** 0.007  0.036 0.118*  0.076**  0.009  0.029  0.114*  
 
(0.026) (0.688) (0.528) (0.072) (0.036) (0.845) (0.408) (0.080) (0.029) (0.796) (0.500) (0.080) 
 








(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept 0.016  0.163***  0.004  0.183**  0.009  0.168***  0.030  0.207**  0.018  0.141***  -0.036  0.123  
 
(0.700) (<0.001) (0.943) (0.024) (0.843) (0.001) (0.593) (0.018) (0.685) (0.004) (0.524) (0.153) 
Num.of obs. 115 115 115 115 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
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Table 11 Acquirer respective ESG pillar performance and portfolio cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the acquirer’s E, S or G pillar levels on market capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) 
respectively. The event windows of the PCARs are shown in the third line of the table. E, S, G pillar represent environmental pillar, Social pillar and 
Governance pillar respectively. Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fishery. Other industry 
controls include construction, manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale and retail .Variable definitions are displayed in the 




Table 11 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Acquirer E score 0.002  0.002  0.001  0.005  
        
 
(0.549) (0.626) (0.782) (0.403) 
        Acquirer G score 
   
0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  
    
     
(0.752) (0.547) (0.443) (0.533) 
    Acquirer S score 
        
-0.001  0.004  0.009**  0.012  
         
(0.836) (0.386) (0.036) (0.100) 
Premium -0.011  0.018  <0.001  0.008  -0.009  0.019  <0.001  0.011  -0.009  0.020  0.001  0.012  
 
(0.624) (0.378) (0.99) (0.813) (0.681) (0.359) (0.980) (0.753) (0.670) (0.343) (0.948) (0.725) 
Tender offer 0.018  -0.006  0.009  0.021  0.014  -0.007  0.010  0.018  0.015  -0.007  0.012  0.020  
 
(0.289) (0.712) (0.551) (0.426) (0.396) (0.679) (0.517) (0.505) (0.383) (0.684) (0.435) (0.444) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.024  -0.016  0.021  0.030  0.027  -0.017  0.018  0.028  0.025  -0.014  0.023  0.034  
 
(0.302) (0.490) (0.341) (0.427) (0.267) (0.456) (0.422) (0.471) (0.289) (0.542) (0.286) (0.352) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag <0.001 0.016  -0.032 -0.016  0.001  0.020  -0.029  -0.008  0.002  0.018  -0.032  -0.012  
 
(1.000) (0.477) (0.148) (0.665) (0.961) (0.389) (0.193) (0.824) (0.926) (0.432) (0.145) (0.747) 
Pure cash 0.005  0.021  0.003  0.029  0.005  0.020  0.001  0.026  0.005  0.021  0.002  0.028  
 
(0.729) (0.149) (0.858) (0.230) (0.736) (0.190) (0.927) (0.288) (0.760) (0.167) (0.872) (0.256) 
Acquirer size -0.010*  -0.029***  -0.003  -0.042***  -0.008*  -0.028***  -0.003  -0.039***  -0.008  -0.028***  -0.003  -0.039***  
 
(0.065) (<0.001) (0.530) (<0.001) (0.099) (<0.001) (0.565) (<0.001) (0.101) (<0.001) (0.474) (<0.001) 
Agriculture 0.081  -0.019  0.113  0.175  0.079 -0.011  0.122*  0.190  0.088  -0.039  0.064  0.113  
 
(0.284) (0.795) (0.119) (0.150) (0.307) (0.879) (0.097) (0.125) (0.275) (0.613) (0.391) (0.373) 
Mining 0.077*  -0.006  0.099***  0.170***  0.075*  -0.012  0.094**  0.157**  0.074*  -0.010  0.095**  0.158**  
 
(0.057) (0.871) (0.010) (0.009) (0.064) (0.758) (0.015) (0.015) (0.067) (0.790) (0.011) (0.013) 
Real estate 0.050  -0.092*  -0.023  -0.064  0.057  -0.084*  -0.017  -0.045  0.056  -0.081*  -0.007  -0.031  
 
(0.312) (0.058) (0.630) (0.415) (0.238) (0.071) (0.702) (0.555) (0.246) (0.086) (0.879) (0.680) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept 0.044  0.301***  0.004  0.348***  0.035  0.307***  0.014  0.356***  0.043  0.283***  -0.032  0.294***  
 
(0.298) (<0.001) (0.924) (<0.001) (0.442) (<0.001) (0.735) (<0.001) (0.344) (<0.001) (0.455) (<0.001) 
Num.of obs. 115 115 115 115 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
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Table 12 Target ESG risk exposure, management and target cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the target’s aggregate ESG risk and corresponding 
managerial ability on the target cumulated abnormal returns (TCAR). The event windows of the 
TCARs are shown in the third line of the table. Dummy variable Target ESG score0-3 equaling 1 
indicates that the target has future risks in ESG issues, and its risk managerial ability is not 
commensurate with the level of risk. Dummy variable Target ESG score7-10 equaling 1 indicates 
that the target has future risks in ESG issues, but its risk managerial ability is commensurate with the 
level of risk. Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, 
forestry and fishery; and industry control variable transportation represents the industry section of 
transportation and communication. Other industry controls include agriculture, construction, 
manufacturing, wholesale and real estate for columns (1) to (4); agriculture, manufacturing, 
wholesale and real estate for columns (5) to (8).Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. 





Table 12 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target ESG score0-3 0.013  0.002  0.001  0.017  -0.062  -0.009  -0.025  -0.095  
 
(0.585) (0.944) (0.92) (0.689) (0.297) (0.917) (0.329) (0.355) 
Target ESG score7-10 -0.046  0.013  -0.026  -0.059  -0.188**  0.145  -0.036  -0.080  
 
(0.231) (0.819) (0.202) (0.377) (0.032) (0.226) (0.324) (0.590) 
Premium 0.080***  0.420***  -0.013  0.487***  0.181*  -0.031  0.052  0.202  
 
(0.004) (<0.001) (0.356) (<0.001) (0.067) (0.818) (0.216) (0.235) 
Tender offer 0.002  0.048  -0.003  0.048  0.084  -0.117  0.038  0.005  
 
(0.936) (0.259) (0.857) (0.360) (0.389) (0.391) (0.370) (0.976) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.013  0.079  0.012  0.078  0.074  0.025  -0.065  0.033  
 
(0.711) (0.116) (0.515) (0.205) (0.426) (0.845) (0.108) (0.835) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.016  -0.068  -0.018  -0.070  -0.021  0.129  0.052  0.160  
 
(0.655) (0.178) (0.344) (0.258) (0.821) (0.331) (0.211) (0.336) 
Pure cash 0.006  0.038  -0.002  0.042  0.037  0.142*  0.016  0.196**  
 
(0.808) (0.299) (0.867) (0.349) (0.506) (0.075) (0.498) (0.050) 
Target size 0.009  -0.017  -0.010**  -0.018  -0.008  -0.012  -0.007  -0.027  
 
(0.283) (0.148) (0.026) (0.215) (0.631) (0.598) (0.354) (0.355) 
Q 
    
-0.030  -0.061*  0.005  -0.085*  
     
(0.238) (0.087) (0.634) (0.056) 
Leverage 
    
0.052  0.380**  -0.044  0.388**  
     
(0.614) (0.012) (0.326) (0.036) 
ROA 
    
0.379  0.108  -0.084  0.403  
     
(0.201) (0.792) (0.510) (0.432) 
Mining 0.059  -0.009  0.108***  0.158  0.054  0.245  -0.016  0.283  
 
(0.396) (0.932) (0.004) (0.195) (0.789) (0.387) (0.851) (0.423) 
Transportation -0.046  -0.118*  0.032  -0.132  0.024  -0.069  0.062  0.017  
 
(0.317) (0.076) (0.190) (0.103) (0.782) (0.574) (0.110) (0.911) 
Retail -0.062  -0.080  -0.017  -0.159*  -0.085  0.099  -0.024  -0.010  
 
(0.228) (0.278) (0.537) (0.079) (0.452) (0.528) (0.619) (0.960) 
Other industry 
controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.042  0.181*  0.071*  0.211  0.067  0.133  0.050  0.249  
 
(0.573) (0.091) (0.069) (0.108) (0.696) (0.578) (0.504) (0.405) 





Table 13 Target ESG risk exposure, management and portfolio cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the target’s aggregate ESG risk and corresponding 
managerial ability on the market capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR). The 
event windows of the PCARs are shown in the third line of the table. Dummy variable Target ESG 
score0-3 equaling 1 indicates that the target has future risks in ESG issues, and its risk managerial 
ability is not commensurate with the level of risk. Dummy variable Target ESG score7-10 equaling 1 
indicates that the target has future risks in ESG issues, but its risk managerial ability is 
commensurate with the level of risk. Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry 
section of agriculture, forestry and fishery. Other industry controls include agriculture, construction, 
manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale, retail and real estate for columns (1) to 
(4); agriculture, manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale, retail and real estate 
for columns (5) to (8). Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in 




Table 13 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target ESG score0-3 0.002  -0.017  0.007  -0.008  -0.016  0.008  0.062*  0.055  
 
(0.885) (0.303) (0.598) (0.773) (0.615) (0.828) (0.065) (0.391) 
Target ESG Score7-10 -0.029  0.034  -0.022  -0.017  -0.074  0.044  0.027  -0.003  
 
(0.213) (0.201) (0.313) (0.688) (0.107) (0.419) (0.568) (0.978) 
Premium -0.005  -0.007  -0.006  -0.018  0.087*  0.050  -0.019  0.118  
 
(0.759) (0.723) (0.688) (0.556) (0.094) (0.421) (0.728) (0.261) 
Tender offer 0.002  -0.011  -0.007  -0.016  0.007  0.038  0.009  0.054  
 
(0.920) (0.609) (0.681) (0.638) (0.895) (0.543) (0.865) (0.609) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.013  0.012  0.038*  0.062  0.006  0.053  -0.034  0.025  
 
(0.542) (0.623) (0.058) (0.110) (0.903) (0.368) (0.510) (0.802) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.003  -0.021  -0.031  -0.050  -0.026  -0.009  0.020  -0.015  
 
(0.897) (0.384) (0.120) (0.208) (0.609) (0.886) (0.711) (0.886) 
Pure cash 0.003  0.003  -0.002  0.004  0.011  0.019  -0.012  0.018  
 
(0.853) (0.859) (0.911) (0.879) (0.716) (0.596) (0.707) (0.767) 
Target size 0.002  -0.018***  -0.001  -0.016*  0.004  -0.019*  0.012  -0.003  
 
(0.660) (0.002) (0.893) (0.077) (0.623) (0.078) (0.204) (0.876) 
Q 
    
-0.021  -0.009  -0.009  -0.039  
     
(0.114) (0.566) (0.537) (0.154) 
Leverage 
    
-0.019  0.165**  -0.008  0.138  
     
(0.722) (0.016) (0.889) (0.220) 
ROA 
    
0.238  0.040  -0.105  0.174  
     
(0.131) (0.829) (0.525) (0.585) 
Mining 0.043  0.028  0.127***  0.198**  0.054  0.068  -0.081  0.040  
 
(0.307) (0.551) (0.002) (0.012) (0.614) (0.600) (0.473) (0.854) 
Intercept -0.009  0.172***  -0.020  0.143*  -0.023  0.118  -0.089  0.006  
 
(0.839) (0.001) (0.640) (0.087) (0.798) (0.282) (0.354) (0.975) 




Table 14 Acquirer ESG risk exposure, management and cumulated abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the acquirer’s aggregate ESG risk and corresponding 
managerial ability on the acquirer cumulated abnormal returns (ACAR) in columns (1) to (4), on the 
market capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) in columns (5) to (8). Event 
windows of ACAR (PCAR) are shown in the third line of the table. Dummy variable Acquirer ESG 
score0-3 equaling 1 indicates that the acquirer has future risks in ESG issues, and its risk managerial 
ability is not commensurate with the level of risk. Dummy variable Acquirer ESG score7-10 equaling 
1 indicates that the acquirer has future risks in ESG issues, but its risk managerial ability is 
commensurate with the level of risk. Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry 
section of agriculture, forestry and fishery. Other industry controls include agriculture, construction, 
transportation and communication, and wholesale. Variable definitions are displayed in the 





Table 14 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Acquirer ESG score0-3 -0.021  -0.021  -0.025  -0.067**  -0.018  -0.022  -0.019  -0.059**  
 
(0.191) (0.231) (0.231) (0.031) (0.278) (0.167) (0.222) (0.024) 
Acquirer ESG Score7-10 -0.035  0.005  -0.020  -0.050  -0.035  -0.001  -0.009  -0.045  
 
(0.107) (0.829) (0.466) (0.226) (0.111) (0.948) (0.674) (0.191) 
Premium -0.011  0.004  0.003  -0.004  -0.004  0.022  0.003  0.021  
 
(0.603) (0.868) (0.904) (0.924) (0.866) (0.294) (0.875) (0.522) 
Tender offer <0.001  -0.019  0.003  -0.016  0.017  -0.004  0.011  0.024  
 
(0.988) (0.289) (0.877) (0.609) (0.306) (0.808) (0.487) (0.357) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.025  -0.012  0.022  0.036  0.029  -0.012  0.025  0.042  
 
(0.274) (0.641) (0.457) (0.420) (0.219) (0.609) (0.267) (0.255) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.003  0.011  -0.040  -0.026  -0.004  0.016  -0.034  -0.023  
 
(0.904) (0.672) (0.184) (0.554) (0.848) (0.489) (0.130) (0.538) 
Pure cash 0.010  0.050***  -0.002  0.059**  0.005  0.021  0.002  0.028  
 
(0.517) (0.003) (0.936) (0.043) (0.757) (0.148) (0.877) (0.236) 
Acquirer size -0.006  -0.021***  -0.002  -0.029***  -0.008  -0.030***  -0.004  -0.041***  
 
(0.199) (<0.001) (0.784) (0.002) (0.12) (<0.001) (0.453) (<0.001) 
Mining 0.075*  0.015  0.087*  0.178**  0.072*  -0.001  0.103***  0.174***  
 
(0.059) (0.720) (0.087) (0.020) (0.073) (0.979) (0.008) (0.007) 
Manufacturing 0.037*  0.006  0.010  0.053  0.028  -0.010  0.015  0.032  
 
(0.063) (0.762) (0.695) (0.158) (0.160) (0.601) (0.439) (0.299) 
Retail 0.078**  0.017  0.032  0.126*  0.050  -0.003  0.020  0.067  
 
(0.024) (0.648) (0.467) (0.054) (0.150) (0.935) (0.543) (0.218) 
Real estate 0.062  -0.068  -0.036  -0.041  0.052  -0.086*  -0.021  -0.054  
 
(0.188) (0.188) (0.554) (0.644) (0.271) (0.065) (0.650) (0.469) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept 0.021  0.178***  0.017  0.216***  0.046  0.316***  0.015  0.378***  
 
(0.618) (<0.001) (0.760) (0.009) (0.285) (<0.001) (0.713) (<0.001) 





Table 15 Year distributions of targets with and without IVA data 
Observations in this table are obtained by matching the merger data from SDC with the target’s 
financial data from Compustat. Targets in IVA are the targets with ESG data, targets not in IVA are 
the targets without ESG data. 












1999 0 0 
 
1999 85 17.56% 
2000 2 1.61% 
 
2000 61 12.60% 
2001 0 0.00% 
 
2001 40 8.26% 
2002 0 0.00% 
 
2002 27 5.58% 
2003 0 0.00% 
 
2003 27 5.58% 
2004 2 1.61% 
 
2004 31 6.40% 
2005 1 0.81% 
 
2005 37 7.64% 
2006 6 4.84% 
 
2006 34 7.02% 
2007 8 6.45% 
 
2007 25 5.17% 
2008 7 5.65% 
 
2008 18 3.72% 
2009 10 8.06% 
 
2009 27 5.58% 
2010 4 3.23% 
 
2010 21 4.34% 
2011 7 5.65% 
 
2011 15 3.10% 
2012 9 7.26% 
 
2012 12 2.48% 
2013 11 8.87% 
 
2013 4 0.83% 
2014 21 16.94% 
 
2014 10 2.07% 
2015 36 29.03% 
 
2015 10 2.07% 





Table 16 Industry distributions of targets with and without IVA data 
Observations in this table are obtained by matching the merger data from SDC with the target’s 
financial data from Compustat. Targets in IVA are the targets with ESG data, targets not in IVA are 
the targets without ESG data. Industries are defined according to two-digit SIC code. 











and fishery 1 0.81%  
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishery  2 0.41% 
Mining  7 5.65% 
 
Mining   19 3.93% 
Construction  0 0.00% 
 
Construction  5 1.03% 
Manufacturing  59 47.58% 
 
Manufacturing  199 41.12% 
Transportation and 
communication 15 12.10%  
Transportation and 
communication 54 11.16% 
Wholesale  1 0.81% 
 
Wholesale  11 2.27% 
Retail  5 4.03% 
 
Retail  19 3.93% 
Real estate  9 7.26% 
 
Real estate 16 3.31% 
Service  27 21.77% 
 
Service  159 32.85% 





Table 17 T-tests on differences between targets with IVA and non-IVA controls targets  
The table presents the t-test procedures on differences between targets in IVA database, and their 
controls targets not in IVA database. Control targets are matched with targets by the same 
announcement year, the same industry and the smallest absolute value of the difference between their 
market value four weeks prior to the announcement date. Target size equals to the logarithm of target 
market capital ($mil) four weeks prior to the announcement date.  
Variable N Maximum Minimum Mean Std Error t Value Pr > |t| 
IVA target size-control target 
size 
115 7.354  -2.447  1.825  0.177  10.290  <.0001 
IVA target leverage-control 
target leverage 
114 0.904  -1.331  0.091  0.032  2.870  0.005  
IVA target ROA-control 
target ROA 
115 0.613  -0.655  0.047  0.017  2.680  0.009  




Table 18 Aggregate ESG performance of large targets and abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the large target’s aggregate ESG level on target cumulated 
abnormal returns (TCAR) in columns (1) to (4), and on market capital weighted portfolio cumulated 
abnormal returns (PCAR) in columns (5) to (8). Event windows of TCAR (PCAR) are shown in the 
third line of the table. Large targets are defined as the targets with an above median logarithm of 
target market capital four weeks prior to the announcement in the sample group C. Sample group C 
consists of the mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. Industry control 
variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fish. Industry controls 
include agriculture, manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale, retail and real 
estate. Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target ESG score 0.015  0.015  -0.005  0.025  0.008  0.005  0.005  0.019  
 
(0.625) (0.647) (0.644) (0.537) (0.681) (0.621) (0.602) (0.398) 
Premium 0.283  -0.255  0.102  0.130  0.029  0.035  -0.056  0.008  
 
(0.205) (0.271) (0.179) (0.637) (0.826) (0.617) (0.433) (0.957) 
Tender offer 0.068  -0.121  -0.044  -0.098  0.007  0.013  -0.017  0.003  
 
(0.647) (0.447) (0.385) (0.619) (0.938) (0.794) (0.731) (0.977) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.013  0.119  0.025  0.157  0.012  0.005  0.044  0.061  
 
(0.930) (0.471) (0.635) (0.447) (0.905) (0.917) (0.405) (0.571) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.031  0.051  -0.016  0.067  -0.005  0.027  0.027  0.049  
 
(0.831) (0.739) (0.748) (0.728) (0.954) (0.577) (0.580) (0.629) 
Pure cash 0.012  -0.011  -0.018  -0.017  <0.001  0.007  -0.009  -0.002  
 
(0.804) (0.837) (0.296) (0.798) (1.000) (0.665) (0.580) (0.951) 
Target size -0.050  -0.154  -0.017  -0.220  -0.073  0.017  0.017  -0.039  
 
(0.635) (0.195) (0.636) (0.145) (0.294) (0.636) (0.626) (0.592) 
Q -0.002  0.152  -0.023  0.127  -0.092  -0.039  -0.065  -0.197  
 
(0.995) (0.597) (0.796) (0.722) (0.595) (0.666) (0.484) (0.318) 
Leverage 0.737  1.153  -0.135  1.755  1.086  0.054  -0.149  0.991  
 
(0.565) (0.401) (0.749) (0.312) (0.209) (0.898) (0.726) (0.285) 
ROA 0.122  -0.015  0.109  0.216  0.179  0.044  0.127  0.350  
 
(0.581) (0.948) (0.171) (0.462) (0.227) (0.553) (0.121) (0.053) 
Industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.254  0.245  0.222  0.214  -0.042  -0.151  0.052  -0.140  
 
(0.658) (0.684) (0.269) (0.776) (0.908) (0.438) (0.785) (0.725) 




Table 19 Large targets’ respective ESG pillar performance and target cumulated abnormal 
returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the large target’s E, S or G pillar levels on target cumulated 
abnormal returns (TCAR) respectively. The event windows of the TCARs are shown in the third line 
of the table. E, S, and G pillar represent environmental pillar, social pillar and governance pillar 
respectively. Large targets are defined as the targets with an above median logarithm of target market 
capital four weeks prior to the announcement in sample group C. Sample group C consists of the 
mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. Industry control variable 
agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fish. Other industry controls 
include transportation and communication, wholesale, retail and real estate. Variable definitions are 
displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 




Table 19 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score -0.053  0.040  0.019  0.005  
        
 
(0.136) (0.311) (0.111) (0.916) 
        Target G score 
   
0.062***  -0.015  -0.006  0.041  
    
     
(0.002) (0.622) (0.509) (0.26) 
    Target S score 
        
-0.037  0.041  0.005  0.009  
         
(0.326) (0.291) (0.704) (0.856) 
Premium 0.109  0.250  -0.100  0.259  0.270*  0.326  -0.060  0.535  -0.054  0.351  -0.030  0.267  
 
(0.646) (0.383) (0.224) (0.508) (0.059) (0.309) (0.535) (0.164) (0.811) (0.168) (0.717) (0.425) 
Tender offer 0.318  -0.202  0.091  0.207  0.171*  -0.172  0.103  0.101  0.367*  -0.254  0.082  0.196  
 
(0.078) (0.293) (0.110) (0.428) (0.076) (0.425) (0.152) (0.678) (0.076) (0.203) (0.232) (0.461) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.180  -0.155  -0.083*  -0.058  0.011  -0.073  -0.045  -0.107  0.050  -0.040  -0.047  -0.038  
 
(0.182) (0.308) (0.076) (0.773) (0.857) (0.629) (0.353) (0.540) (0.713) (0.773) (0.350) (0.847) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag -0.054  0.140  0.048  0.134  0.048  0.090  0.025  0.163  0.071  0.018  0.020  0.109  
 
(0.679) (0.369) (0.279) (0.529) (0.458) (0.576) (0.621) (0.391) (0.653) (0.912) (0.727) (0.635) 
Pure cash -0.202  0.166  0.065  0.028  -0.014  0.019  -0.004  0.001  -0.036  0.052  0.000  0.016  
 
(0.234) (0.392) (0.237) (0.913) (0.790) (0.887) (0.932) (0.993) (0.768) (0.681) (0.996) (0.928) 
Target size -0.007  -0.006  -0.012  -0.025  -0.060  -0.001  -0.010  -0.071  -0.004  -0.005  -0.015  -0.024  
 
(0.868) (0.895) (0.396) (0.711) (0.038) (0.993) (0.608) (0.329) (0.930) (0.924) (0.384) (0.726) 
Q -0.041  -0.172  -0.020  -0.233  0.004  -0.175  -0.021  -0.191  -0.086  -0.127  -0.011  -0.223  
 
(0.639) (0.130) (0.488) (0.137) (0.924) (0.157) (0.561) (0.176) (0.409) (0.255) (0.770) (0.163) 
Leverage -0.034  0.263  -0.010  0.219  -0.108  0.239  -0.023  0.107  0.042  0.208  -0.038  0.212  
 
(0.875) (0.318) (0.883) (0.537) (0.339) (0.398) (0.784) (0.735) (0.857) (0.406) (0.651) (0.539) 
ROA -0.144  1.579  0.170  1.605  -0.273  1.227  -0.004  0.949  0.648  0.966  -0.099  1.515  
 
(0.898) (0.258) (0.645) (0.395) (0.616) (0.383) (0.992) (0.552) (0.579) (0.432) (0.812) (0.381) 
Agriculture 0.071  -0.041  0.125  0.156  -0.081  -0.012  0.137*  0.044  -0.026  0.073  0.135  0.182  
 
(0.679) (0.838) (0.057) (0.581) (0.387) (0.959) (0.093) (0.867) (0.907) (0.751) (0.125) (0.572) 
Manufacturing 0.018  -0.017  0.116**  0.118  0.107  -0.079  0.087  0.115  0.032  -0.002  0.097  0.127  
 
(0.887) (0.913) (0.029) (0.583) (0.114) (0.606) (0.104) (0.522) (0.830) (0.988) (0.111) (0.566) 
Other industry 
controls Not significant 
Intercept 0.433  -0.008  -0.014  0.411  0.106  0.345  0.153  0.604  0.243  0.006  0.128  0.378  
 
(0.415) (0.989) (0.933) (0.627) (0.606) (0.510) (0.356) (0.328) (0.667) (0.991) (0.533) (0.645) 





Table 20 Large targets’ respective ESG pillar performance and portfolio cumulated abnormal 
returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the large target’s E, S or G pillar levels on the market 
capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) respectively. The event windows of 
the PCARs are shown in the third line of the table. E, S, and G pillar represent environmental pillar, 
social pillar and governance pillar respectively. Large targets are defined as the targets with an above 
median logarithm of target market capital four weeks prior to the announcement in sample group C. 
Sample group C consists of the mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. 
Industry control variable agriculture represents the industry section of agriculture, forestry and fish. 
Other industry controls include manufacturing, transportation and communication, wholesale, retail 
and real estate. Variable definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in 




Table 20 (continued) 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Acquirer E score -0.028  0.009  -0.001  -0.021  
        
 
(0.225) (0.489) (0.914) (0.456) 
        Acquirer G score 
   
0.037***  -0.002  -0.003  0.032*  
    
     
(0.005) (0.863) (0.746) (0.077) 
    Acquirer S score 
       
-0.020  0.000  0.007  -0.013  
         
(0.414) (0.974) (0.607) (0.636) 
Premium 0.077  0.055  -0.053  0.080  0.188  0.082  -0.078  0.193  -0.010  0.093  -0.069  0.014  
 
(0.634) (0.554) (0.593) (0.692) (0.081) (0.418) (0.443) (0.264) (0.946) (0.280) (0.405) (0.937) 
Tender offer 0.048  0.052  -0.040  0.059  -0.041  0.054  -0.032  -0.019  0.074  0.051  -0.047  0.078  
 
(0.655) (0.408) (0.537) (0.656) (0.530) (0.435) (0.642) (0.866) (0.531) (0.447) (0.473) (0.582) 
Target hi-tech flag 0.067  0.009  -0.005  0.071  -0.029  0.025  -0.002  -0.007  -0.002  0.022  0.002  0.021  
 
(0.440) (0.857) (0.928) (0.509) (0.530) (0.609) (0.959) (0.932) (0.978) (0.657) (0.972) (0.840) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag -0.024  0.008  0.037  0.021  0.033  -0.002  0.036  0.067  0.043  0.000  0.024  0.068  
 
(0.784) (0.874) (0.496) (0.848) (0.502) (0.972) (0.500) (0.440) (0.680) (0.994) (0.668) (0.587) 
Pure cash -0.130  0.049  0.009  -0.072  -0.030  0.016  0.015  0.001  -0.041  0.015  0.021  -0.006  
 
(0.258) (0.448) (0.887) (0.600) (0.471) (0.716) (0.726) (0.991) (0.608) (0.736) (0.644) (0.953) 
Target size -0.010  0.008  -0.012  -0.015  -0.043  0.007  -0.008  -0.044  -0.009  0.005  -0.010  -0.013  
 
(0.716) (0.643) (0.496) (0.680) (0.051) (0.718) (0.682) (0.201) (0.773) (0.761) (0.574) (0.719) 
Q -0.069  0.012  0.015  -0.041  -0.040  0.013  0.012  -0.016  -0.093  0.014  0.020  -0.058  
 
(0.270) (0.727) (0.67) (0.580) (0.270) (0.726) (0.746) (0.796) (0.193) (0.703) (0.580) (0.471) 
Leverage -0.109  -0.009  -0.049  -0.167  -0.159  -0.018  -0.039  -0.217  -0.069  -0.022  -0.046  -0.137  
 
(0.463) (0.918) (0.584) (0.375) (0.095) (0.838) (0.664) (0.173) (0.654) (0.794) (0.591) (0.463) 
ROA 0.617  0.133  -0.218  0.531  0.488  0.032  -0.154  0.366  1.038  0.009  -0.207  0.840  
 
(0.431) (0.763) (0.641) (0.582) (0.269) (0.943) (0.729) (0.618) (0.199) (0.984) (0.622) (0.367) 
Agriculture 0.152  0.034  0.113  0.299*  0.060  0.036  0.122  0.217  0.100  0.030  0.134  0.264  
 
(0.220) (0.619) (0.146) (0.075) (0.411) (0.633) (0.139) (0.114) (0.491) (0.709) (0.128) (0.158) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept 0.324  -0.189  0.121  0.256  0.164  -0.105  0.096  0.155  0.224  -0.096  0.044  0.172  
 
(0.370) (0.364) (0.573) (0.563) (0.319) (0.532) (0.569) (0.576) (0.546) (0.642) (0.828) (0.696) 




Table 21 Aggregate ESG performance of small targets and abnormal returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the small target’s aggregate ESG level on the target 
cumulated abnormal returns (TCAR) in columns (1) to (4), and on the market capital weighted 
portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) in columns (5) to (8). Event windows of TCAR 
(PCAR) are shown in the third line of the table. Small targets are defined as the targets with a below 
median logarithm of target market capital four weeks prior to the announcement in sample group C. 
Sample group C consists of the mergers with target IVA’s data and financial data from Compustat. 
Industry controls include mining, manufacturing, transportation and communication, retail. Variable 
definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 
10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 




(-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target ESG score -0.013  0.049**  -0.008  0.029  -0.004  0.014  -0.016  -0.006  
 
(0.543) (0.044) (0.377) (0.402) (0.677) (0.339) (0.187) (0.813) 
Premium 0.250  -0.551**  0.119  -0.183  0.125  0.046  0.084  0.255  
 
(0.194) (0.013) (0.131) (0.540) (0.176) (0.722) (0.413) (0.242) 
Tender offer -0.012  -0.062  0.019  -0.056  0.026  0.005  -0.013  0.018  
 
(0.942) (0.732) (0.786) (0.835) (0.749) (0.967) (0.886) (0.928) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.072  0.773**  -0.147  0.554  -0.041  -0.038  -0.040  -0.118  
 
(0.786) (0.014) (0.185) (0.200) (0.749) (0.836) (0.785) (0.697) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.111  -0.766**  0.173  -0.481  -0.011  0.122  -0.001  0.110  
 
(0.738) (0.045) (0.209) (0.367) (0.947) (0.596) (0.994) (0.772) 
Pure cash 0.099  0.085  0.016  0.200  0.037  0.021  0.005  0.062  
 
(0.292) (0.398) (0.673) (0.185) (0.414) (0.746) (0.925) (0.558) 
Target size -0.014  -0.025  -0.013  -0.052  0.013  -0.027  0.026  0.011  
 
(0.671) (0.493) (0.330) (0.330) (0.427) (0.245) (0.169) (0.767) 
Q -0.010  -0.179  0.051  -0.138  -0.029  -0.007  0.042  0.006  
 
(0.878) (0.018) (0.063) (0.190) (0.351) (0.876) (0.241) (0.936) 
Leverage 0.143  -0.163  0.068  0.048  -0.005  0.307*  -0.003  0.300  
 
(0.579) (0.558) (0.519) (0.906) (0.970) (0.098) (0.986) (0.314) 
ROA 0.291  0.261  0.088  0.641  -0.014  -0.087  0.351  0.251  
 
(0.656) (0.710) (0.739) (0.538) (0.965) (0.848) (0.331) (0.737) 
Industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.059  0.968**  -0.117  0.792  -0.054  0.034  -0.285  -0.305  
 
(0.891) (0.049) (0.506) (0.254) (0.793) (0.908) (0.234) (0.536) 




Table 22 Small targets’ respective ESG pillar performance and target cumulated abnormal 
returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the small target’s E, S or G pillar levels on the target 
cumulated abnormal returns (TCAR) respectively. The event windows of the TCARs are shown in 
the third line of the table. E, S, G pillar represent environmental pillar, social pillar and governance 
pillar respectively. Small targets are defined as the targets with a below median logarithm of target 
market capital four weeks prior to the announcement in sample group C. Sample group C consists of 
the mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. Other industry controls 
include mining and transportation and communication. Variable definitions are displayed in the 





Table 22 (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent TCAR 
variable (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score -0.005 0.043 0.008 0.047 
        
 
(0.852) (0.151) (0.436) (0.247) 
        Target G score 
   
0.025 0.021 0.005 0.051*  
    
     
(0.145) (0.322) (0.528) (0.060) 
    Target S score 
        
0.003 0.015 -0.017**  0.001 
         
(0.878) (0.556) (0.030) (0.983) 
Premium 0.230 -0.500** 0.098 -0.172 0.142 -0.534** 0.089 -0.303 0.225 -0.468** 0.111 -0.132 
 
(0.227) (0.029) (0.204) (0.551) (0.440) (0.030) (0.267) (0.286) (0.235) (0.048) (0.104) (0.658) 
Tender offer -0.020 -0.040 0.011 -0.050 -0.102 -0.095 -0.002 -0.198 -0.026 -0.048 0.037 -0.037 
 
(0.907) (0.834) (0.876) (0.850) (0.547) (0.654) (0.984) (0.445) (0.881) (0.816) (0.544) (0.895) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.070 0.612* -0.212 0.330 -0.007 0.950*** -0.146 0.797* -0.107 0.834** -0.117 0.610 
 
(0.820) (0.093) (0.102) (0.488) (0.977) (0.008) (0.200) (0.055) (0.693) (0.019) (0.233) (0.173) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.103 -0.589 0.233 -0.252 -0.059 -1.002** 0.151 -0.910* 0.140 -0.801* 0.138 -0.523 
 
(0.778) (0.169) (0.128) (0.655) (0.861) (0.029) (0.311) (0.092) (0.680) (0.062) (0.260) (0.343) 
Pure cash 0.110 0.059 0.028 0.198 0.093 0.018 0.020 0.131 0.117 0.055 <0.001 0.172 
 
(0.244) (0.572) (0.451) (0.176) (0.291) (0.865) (0.593) (0.327) (0.232) (0.629) (0.996) (0.270) 
Target size -0.013 -0.034 -0.015 -0.062 -0.025 -0.035 -0.015 -0.075 -0.014 -0.025 -0.015 -0.053 
 
(0.703) (0.386) (0.295) (0.249) (0.452) (0.394) (0.290) (0.145) (0.690) (0.547) (0.221) (0.335) 
Q -0.010 -0.181** 0.049* -0.143 -0.030 -0.189** 0.047* -0.172* -0.010 -0.167** 0.042* -0.134 
 
(0.873) (0.024) (0.077) (0.167) (0.634) (0.025) (0.095) (0.085) (0.882) (0.047) (0.082) (0.214) 
Leverage 0.140 -0.052 0.108 0.196 -0.004 -0.356 0.047 -0.313 0.164 -0.192 0.044 0.017 
 
(0.616) (0.870) (0.340) (0.646) (0.988) (0.293) (0.684) (0.444) (0.533) (0.543) (0.633) (0.968) 
ROA 0.296 -0.105 -0.062 0.129 0.365 0.612 0.076 1.053 0.225 0.478 0.073 0.776 
 
(0.691) (0.901) (0.835) (0.910) (0.555) (0.433) (0.776) (0.273) (0.731) (0.542) (0.750) (0.461) 
Manufacturing 0.022 -0.297 0.123 -0.152 -0.051 -0.489** 0.085 -0.455 0.041 -0.388* 0.066 -0.28 
 
(0.910) (0.187) (0.129) (0.609) (0.773) (0.040) (0.281) (0.108) (0.822) (0.093) (0.315) (0.350) 
Retail <0.001 -0.412 0.133 -0.279 -0.198 -0.809* 0.052 -0.955 0.034 -0.576 0.038 -0.504 
 
(0.999) (0.296) (0.343) (0.597) (0.553) (0.066) (0.717) (0.074) (0.917) (0.153) (0.742) (0.341) 
Other industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.09 0.988* -0.177 0.722 0.085 1.316** -0.111 1.29* -0.133 1.042* -0.014 0.895 
 
(0.838) (0.060) (0.323) (0.292) (0.840) (0.022) (0.546) (0.058) (0.771) (0.070) (0.928) (0.231) 





Table 23 Small targets’ respective ESG pillar performance and portfolio cumulated abnormal 
returns 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the small target’s E, S or G pillar levels on the market 
capital weighted portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (PCAR) respectively. The event windows of 
the PCARs are shown in the third line of the table. E, S, G pillar represent environmental pillar, 
social pillar and governance pillar respectively. Small targets are defined as the targets with a below 
median logarithm of target market capital four weeks prior to the announcement in sample group C. 
Sample group C consists of the mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. 
Industry controls include mining, manufacturing, transportation and communication, retail. Variable 
definitions are displayed in the Appendices. The p-values are given in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 




Table 23 (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent PCAR 
variable (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) (-20,-2) (-1,1) (2,20) (-20,20) 
Target E score 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.009 
        
 
(0.933) (0.826) (0.769) (0.748) 
        
Target G score 
   
0.009 -0.001 0.013 0.022 
    
     
(0.262) (0.963) (0.183) (0.267) 
    
Target S score 
        
0.008 0.002 -0.015 -0.005 
         
(0.417) (0.897) (0.214) (0.848) 
Premium 0.117 0.068 0.052 0.237 0.086 0.073 0.012 0.171 0.115 0.071 0.061 0.247 
 
(0.202) (0.605) (0.622) (0.268) (0.342) (0.593) (0.910) (0.423) (0.198) (0.588) (0.544) (0.248) 
Tender offer 0.023 0.014 -0.026 0.011 -0.007 0.017 -0.066 -0.057 0.012 0.012 -0.004 0.02 
 
(0.781) (0.909) (0.792) (0.956) (0.933) (0.895) (0.495) (0.772) (0.883) (0.920) (0.964) (0.919) 
Target hi-tech flag -0.056 -0.033 -0.098 -0.186 -0.015 -0.011 -0.024 -0.05 -0.071 -0.014 -0.034 -0.118 
 
(0.705) (0.879) (0.578) (0.592) (0.902) (0.954) (0.872) (0.866) (0.579) (0.942) (0.820) (0.700) 
Acquirer hi-tech flag 0.002 0.123 0.048 0.174 -0.075 0.104 -0.077 -0.047 0.018 0.105 -0.017 0.107 
 
(0.991) (0.633) (0.817) (0.675) (0.652) (0.682) (0.694) (0.904) (0.909) (0.660) (0.927) (0.781) 
Pure cash 0.042 0.009 0.023 0.073 0.034 0.007 0.01 0.051 0.052 0.009 0.001 0.062 
 
(0.351) (0.895) (0.661) (0.484) (0.430) (0.917) (0.836) (0.614) (0.253) (0.894) (0.988) (0.569) 
Target size 0.013 -0.029 0.025 0.01 0.009 -0.028 0.021 0.002 0.014 -0.028 0.025 0.011 
 
(0.436) (0.244) (0.200) (0.799) (0.572) (0.267) (0.276) (0.954) (0.388) (0.256) (0.189) (0.774) 
Q -0.03 -0.006 0.04 0.004 -0.037 -0.005 0.031 -0.011 -0.026 -0.005 0.034 0.003 
 
(0.345) (0.893) (0.294) (0.960) (0.240) (0.914) (0.395) (0.881) (0.403) (0.921) (0.352) (0.966) 
Leverage 0.004 0.306 0.032 0.343 -0.06 0.294 -0.069 0.165 0.015 0.294 -0.011 0.298 
 
(0.975) (0.13) (0.838) (0.282) (0.644) (0.153) (0.65) (0.594) (0.901) (0.124) (0.936) (0.321) 
ROA -0.049 -0.074 0.216 0.094 0.017 -0.022 0.347 0.343 -0.045 -0.021 0.294 0.229 
 
(0.891) (0.888) (0.611) (0.911) (0.956) (0.963) (0.335) (0.633) (0.884) (0.964) (0.410) (0.756) 
Industry controls Not significant 
Intercept -0.074 0.073 -0.362 -0.363 0.001 0.084 -0.244 -0.159 -0.131 0.074 -0.235 -0.293 
 
(0.723) (0.812) (0.160) (0.466) (0.994) (0.790) (0.320) (0.745) (0.54) (0.818) (0.348) (0.571) 




Table 24 Year distributions of targets in large (small) target sample group 
Small targets are defined as the targets with a below median logarithm of target market capital four 
weeks prior to announcement in sample group C; and large targets are defined as the targets with an 
above median logarithm of target market capital four weeks prior to announcement in sample group 
C. Sample group C consists of the mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. 

















2000 0 0.00% 
2004 1 4.35% 
 
2004 1 3.23% 
2005 0 0.00% 
 
2005 1 3.23% 
2006 1 4.35% 
 
2006 1 3.23% 
2007 1 4.35% 
 
2007 3 9.68% 
2008 1 4.35% 
 
2008 0 0.00% 
2010 1 4.35% 
 
2010 0 0.00% 
2011 2 8.70% 
 
2011 0 0.00% 
2012 0 0.00% 
 
2012 2 6.45% 
2013 2 8.70% 
 
2013 5 16.13% 
2014 4 17.39% 
 
2014 9 29.03% 
2015 9 39.13% 
 
2015 9 29.03% 





Table 25 Industry distributions of targets in large (small) target sample group 
Small targets are defined as the targets with a below median logarithm of target market capital four 
weeks prior to announcement in sample group C; and large targets are defined as the targets with an 
above median logarithm of target market capital four weeks prior to announcement in sample group 
C. Sample group C consists of the mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. 
Industries are defined according to two-digit SIC code. 














Agriculture, forestry, fishery 1 4.35% 
 
Agriculture, forestry, fishery  20 64.52% 
Construction  1 4.35% 
 
Construction  0 0.00% 
Manufacturing  8 34.78% 
 
Manufacturing  0 0.00% 
Transportation and 
communication  3 13.04%  
Transportation and 
communication  3 9.68% 
Wholesale  1 4.35% 
 
Wholesale  0 0.00% 
Retail  2 8.70% 
 
Retail  3 9.68% 
Real estate  1 4.35% 
 
Real estate  0 0.00% 
service 6 26.09% 
 
Service  5 16.13% 





Table 26 T-test on difference between means of institutional blockholding of targets in small 
and in large target sample group 
Blockholders are defined as a 5% (or higher) shareholder. Small targets are defined as the targets 
with a below median logarithm of target market capital four weeks prior to announcement in sample 
group C; and large targets are defined as the targets with an above median logarithm of target market 
capital four weeks prior to announcement in sample group C. Sample group C consists of the 
mergers with target’s IVA data and financial data from Compustat. 
Panel A 
       
Variable: Institutional 
 
      







Large target 23 0.200  0.116  0.024  0 0.394  
 
Small target 28 0.370  0.195  0.037  0 0.683  
 
Diff (Large target - Small 
target)  
-0.170  0.164  0.046  
   
        
Panel B 
       
class Method Mean 
95% CL 
Mean  
Std Dev 95% CL Std Dev 
Large target 
 
0.200  0.150  0.250  0.116  0.089  0.164  
Small target 
 
0.370  0.294  0.446  0.195  0.154  0.266  
Diff (Large target - Small 
target) Pooled -0.170 -0.263 -0.077 0.164 0.137 0.205 




-0.170  -0.259  -0.082  
   
        
Panel C 
       
Method Variances DF t Value Pr > |t| 
   
Pooled Equal 49 -3.68 0.001  
   
Satterthwaite Unequal 44.938 -3.86 <0.001  
   
        
Panel D 
       
Equality of Variances 
      
Method Num DF 
Den D
F 
F Value Pr > F 
   
Folded F 27 22 2.85 0.015  
   
 
 
 
